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26 SEPTEMBER 1986

**Worldwide Report**

# **ARMS CONTROL**

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26 SEPTEMBER 1986

## WORLDWIDE REPORT

## ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA 'REJOINDER': COSMOS-1767 NOT ASAT WEAPON

PM091134 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Sep 86 First Edition p 4

[V. Drobkov "Rejoinder": "With Sights on Space"; uppercase passage printed in boldface]

[Text] There is no denying that things are plainly not going the way the champions and advocates of the crazy "star wars" idea would like.

Judge for yourselves. Congress has cut the budget requested by the White House and the Pentagon for the creation [sozdaniye] of space arms. The allies, who have been drawn into the orbit of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," are complaining that they are getting just crumbs from the order pie, deep into which American monopolies have themselves already sunk their teeth. The carrier rockets earmarked for launching into space military satellites and equipment for conducting experiments within the SDI framework frequently blow up. The Shuttle program, which has also been widely used by the Pentagon, will in no way recover from the shock of the disaster which took the lives of seven astronauts.

All this irritates the Pentagon. It is seeking to accelerate research and development on SDI. The propaganda campaign in support of "star wars" is being fueled with no less and, perhaps, even with greater frenzy. Here emphasis is placed not so much on the White House's thoroughly lackluster assurances of the reliability of the "space shield" (as is known, they are even rejected by many American scientists and military specialists) as on the claim that "the Soviet Union has already created [sozdat] its own AEM system." Consequently, the United States has no option but to rush with its last ounce of strength after the Russian "bear," which is said to have craftily seized the "winner's laurels" in the arms sphere that are so dear to Washington.

In this way the old lie about "Soviet military superiority," which has already been exposed and refuted repeatedly, is being reactivated in a new guise -- with its sights on space, so to speak. The latest example of this approach can be provided by the recent publication of a verbose article in THE WASHINGTON TIMES claiming that the Russians might already have created [sozdat] an "inexpensive antisatellite weapon" capable of knocking out the SDI systems being developed [razrabatyvat] by the Pentagon. As an example of a test of such a weapon, the newspaper, citing some "American expert," sets up a propaganda mist around the "intriguing" Soviet Cosmos-1767 satellite. That satellite, the newspaper frighteningly claims, could be a "killer satellite" created [sozdat] and tested to hit American space targets.

WE HAVE CONSULTED THE COMPETENT SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS AND RECEIVED THE AUTHORITATIVE REPLY THAT THERE IS AND CAN BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE LAUNCH OF COSMOS-1767 AND TESTS OF ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS. AS HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE CASE, THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT CONDUCTING ANY PREPARATIONS FOR "STAR WARS" AND CALLS ON THE UNITED STATES ALSO TO ABANDON THIS DANGEROUS AND COSTLY VENTURE.

It must be supposed that all this is well known in Washington and, let us hope, even in THE WASHINGTON TIMES editorial office.

What, then, can account for the increasingly importunate appearance both in the American press and in officials' speeches of totally uncorroborated claims that the USSR has "overtaken the United States in the space arms sphere"?

The answer to this question should probably be sought not in the invented "actions of Moscow [quotation mark as published] but in the obviously increased preparations for "star wars" in the United States, where not only is research work on SDI under way now but test launches of antisatellite rockets are being conducted as well. As our Washington correspondent reports, citing AP, two satellites will be launched from Cape Canaveral in the next few days. In the course of a secret experiment one of them is to detect and destroy the other. So, if we are to speak of "killer satellites," we cannot fail to see that it is the United States that is embarking in real earnest on their development [razrabotka] and testing.

Against such a militarist background the Washington administration's persistence protestations of some "desire" to curb the military race and even to limit nuclear arsenals can no longer mislead anyone. And a new helping of lies with sights on space will not help this.

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CSO: 5100/1570



SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: JAPANESE OPPOSITION CONDEMNS INVOLVEMENT IN SDI

TASS Report

LD091104 Moscow TASS in English 0919 GMT 9 Sep 86

[Text] Tokyo September 9 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vasilii Golovin reports:

All of Japan's opposition parties have today condemned the decision of the Nakasone government to join in the U.S. "star wars" programme.

This move of the conservative government contravenes the resolution of the Japanese parliament on peaceful uses of outer space and signals Tokyo's joining in the strategy of turning the whole planet and near-earth space into an arena of war, says the statement by Tsurao Yamaguchi, general secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Socialist Party. The announcement on joining in the SDI has been an act of open assistance to the American plans of the nuclear weapons race and spreading the weapons race to outer space, says the statement by Mitsuhiro Kanenko, chairman of the Secretariat of the Communist Party.

The Japanese Communists and Socialists have demanded that the decision on Japan's participation in the star wars programme be immediately cancelled. All opposition parties have stressed their intention to oppose at the opening session of the parliament the policy of Japan's joining in the SDI.

Radio Moscow Commentary

LD090006 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Sep 86

[Nikolay Lutsenko commentary]

[Text] The Japanese Government decided today to participate in the U.S. star wars program. Here at the microphone is Nikolay Lutsenko with a commentary:

Of the 10 countries to which Washington proposed participation in the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, Japan has become the fourth state, after Britain, the FRG, and Israel, to consent to participate in this wide-scale program for the militarization of space. From this moment Japan has taken up a new capacity, having become officially included in the space-strike weapons race. As a matter of fact -- fateful because, with its SDI participation the danger of a retaliatory nuclear strike on Japanese



territory increases considerably. Prime Minister Nakasone was the first to express understanding for the U.S. star wars program. In November 1983 the latest technology for military use started to arrive for the first time in the United States from Japan. The other day plans were announced in Tokyo for the creation of their own space shuttle, which on many points will surpass the U.S. shuttle. It is therefore not surprising that U.S. interest in having Japan take part in SDI is quite different from its interest regarding Western Europe where the participation of NATO countries is designed to demonstrate the outward cohesion of the alliance. But the potential of the proposals made by Japanese firms for star wars is so great that, perhaps, any U.S. version of an agreement could only be taken as a restriction on their freedom of trade.

But what is concealed behind the quick profits in the SDI golf fever? Here is the opinion of a private American organization, the Council on Economic priorities: Japan's participation in the star wars program will not strengthen but weaken this country's security; moreover, it will check progress in creating new civilian technology for commercial conservatives to join SDI. The decision has flagrantly violated the legislative foundations of the Japanese state, and in particular, the peaceful constitution and a special parliamentary resolution of 1969 restricting space research to exclusively peaceful ends. Attempts to justify this step by propaganda look clumsy, to say the least. For example, in reply to a question from a deputy of the socialist party, Foreign Minister Kuranari said: the Strategic Defense Initiative is a U.S. program, and for this reason the parliamentary resolution, supposedly, does not extend to it. Clearly, the minister might care to remember a wise Japanese saying: What is the fate of another today, will be my fate tomorrow.

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CSO: 5100/1570

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### FRG 'CONCERN,' 'APPREHENSION' AT U.S. DECISION ON SDI

LD151213 Hamburg DPA in German 1012 GMT 15 Aug 86

[Text] Bonn, 15 Aug (DPA) — The Federal Government reacted with concern and apprehension today to the decision by the U.S. Congress largely to exclude foreign companies from SDI research. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said today that the Federal Government will immediately make it clear to the U.S. Administration through diplomatic channels that shared information about and participation in the SDI program were the business foundation for German companies in the German-U.S. SDI agreement.

CDU/CSU Group Deputy Chairman Volker Ruebe said today that the U.S. Administration should examine the question of the "predictability" of its own policy. After all, it had called on its alliance partners to take part in SDI. It is now in the Reagan administration's interests to clarify quickly the action of the House of Representatives because a decision by Japan on SDI is also imminent. It is now clear how right they were to approach the SDI project with skepticism, Ruebe said.

Bonn has complained of the protectionism reflected in the fact that the Senate demanded last week that SDI contracts be awarded only to foreign firms in exceptional cases, and that Congressman Lee Aspin has now submitted a motion that all contracts of more than \$100,000 should be given only to U.S. firms.

Federal Economic Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP), who negotiated the agreement in Washington, criticized the "bad policy" of the U.S. Congressmen and complained about the "political difficulties" the U.S.A.'s alliance partners were now in. Helmut Schaefer, foreign policy spokesman of the FDP Bundestag Group, pointed to the great technological hopes for the future entertained by CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss, which have now been proved wrong.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### FRG GOVERNMENT 'ANNOYED' AT U.S. DECISION ON SDI

#### Business Exclusion Critical

DW181327 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 17 Aug 86 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Space Defense: Bonn Angry at United States"]

[Text] Will the SDI agreement on missile defense in space come to nothing? The Federal Government is annoyed at a decision made by the U.S. Senate, according to which orders in connection with SDI are to be placed with foreign companies only if U.S. companies do not want to have them.

FDP defense expert Otaf Feldmann told *Bild am Sonntag*: "We will consider thoroughly our further attitude toward SDI — including possible necessary consequences. That also includes the option envisaged in the SDI agreement of terminating it at 3 months notice."

State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry Lutz Stavenhagen (CDU) told *Bild am Sonntag*: "We must insist that FRG companies participate on the basis of equality, if they are competitive and have something to offer technologically. It would be disastrous if those who want to exclude us Europeans from participation in SDI gain the upperhand in Washington. That would be a serious burden for the alliance and for FRG-U.S. relations."

#### Calls for Adherence to Agreement

LD181452 Hamburg DPA in German 1338 GMT 18 Aug 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 18 Aug (DPA) -- The Federal Government today again underlined the significance of adherence to the FRG-U.S. SDI agreement and said it should not be "put in question by unilateral steps on the part of the U.S. Congress". On Friday (15 August) spokesmen for the Foreign Ministry had even expressed "disquiet and concern" over demands from the U.S. Senate that SDI contracts of consequence should no longer be awarded to foreign firms. However, this had been the "basis of business" for Bonn.

Today, government spokesman Norbert Schaefer described President Reagan to the press as "the ever reliable partner". The Federal Government has "no cause" to doubt fulfillment of the treaty by the U.S. Government. Nevertheless, the Senate's efforts contradict this, Schaefer said.

The bill is still to be dealt with in the mediation committee. Schaefer thus evidently wants to refer to the fact that differing positions between the House of Representatives and the Senate in the U.S. Congress must be resolved by compromise, the nature of which is not apparent at present. Further developments will be "carefully observed" by the Federal Government, the government spokesman affirmed.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### FRG'S HANDELSBLATT CRITICIZES U.S. SENATE SDI DECISION

DW201300 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 20 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Hans Joerg Sottorf: "U.S. Senate Decision on SDI Confirmed Skeptics"]

[Text] In the course of this week the German ambassador to Washington will contact the U.S. Department of State and the Pentagon to explain the Federal Government's concern about the Senate decision largely to exclude foreign firms from SDI research orders. The ambassador's visit to the two departments shows the remark by government spokesman Schaefer, to the effect that the Federal Government has no doubts about the Atlantic alliance partner's loyalty to treaties, was primarily intended for the public. It also shows that that conviction is not shared by everyone in the government.

The accords reached in the spring following long discussions on the principles of general technological cooperation and the guidelines of cooperation by German firms with the Americans were concluded by the Federal Government in the hope that they could create a better climate for cooperation and an unhindered technology flow. For many years, German industry had complained about the shortcomings of such cooperation. Following the conclusion of the two agreements last spring, the Federation of German Industry said the hopes for improvement would still have to be confirmed in practice.

So far, hopes have lagged behind expectations, not only because of the Senate decision, but also because the orders placed with the German economy in the scope of SDI research have remained insignificant, so that the coordination agency set up in the Bonn Economics Ministry specifically for that purpose has anxiously

kept them secret. To say the least, the Senate decision entails the danger that the agreed equal treatment of German and U.S. firms may turn out to be a flop.

Naturally, the Senate decision must be viewed in connection with the forthcoming congressional elections on 4 November. In addition, as in similar cases in the Federal Republic, that vote would have to be dealt with by a joint committee. Nonetheless, it confirms the views of all those politicians in Bonn who have always been skeptical about the accords with the Americans. Even though Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has not made any public statement on the issue, it is known in his ministry that he is not among those who are surprised.

The U.S. Senate decision does not just stress that the repeated warnings about growing protectionist tendencies in the United States, which for security reasons are even more intense in the technology sector, are justified. It also shows that those arguments are beginning to prevail in America, which see in the extremely expensive SDI, as well as in the continuously growing financial requests by the U.S. President for the defense budget, a danger to successful disarmament talks between the two superpowers. The Senate decision not only contains the demand that foreign firms only be allowed to participate in SDI research in exceptional cases, but also a request for a considerable cut in SDI resources.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

NOVOSTI MILITARY ANALYST ON COUNTERMEASURES TO SDI

AU091243 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Sep 86 p 2

[Interview with Colonel Vasiliy Morozov, NOVOSTI military analyst by MAGYAR HIRLAP's Moscow correspondent Ferenc Szaniszlo: "The Soviet Reply To Be Given to SDI"; date and place not given — first paragraph is paper's introduction]

[Text] At the end of the 20th century, people imagine star wars mostly as an exciting episode befitting a science (or nonscience) fiction film. In reality, however, very little separates us from seeing a live picture of the product of our fantasy, if we are left enough time to do that. Our Moscow correspondent Ferenc Szaniszlo interviewed Vasiliy Morozov, the military analyst of the NOVOSTI about the U.S. space armament plans, the Soviet countermeasures, and the chances of "star peace."

[Szanişlo] The United States is striving to implement the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Do the Soviet military experts continue to regard this type of defense system as vulnerable?

[Morozov] Not only the Soviet experts but also many U.S. experts do so. SDI is unable to provide absolute, 100 percent security and there is no "impenetrable shield." And interestingly enough, the moment it turned out that some 5 percent of the other side's missiles would be able to penetrate the shield allegedly made up of space weapons, the Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Weinberger — began talking about the modified version of SDI. The essence of this modified version is that our strategic missiles would be destroyed at launching or perhaps even while they are still in their silos.

[Szanişlo] If the Americans really implement their space defense system, what kind of countermeasures will the Soviet Union take?

[Morozov] In our view, SDI is aimed at achieving a triple goal. The construction of a space defense system, the so-called impenetrable shield; the deployment of first-strike offensive weapons in space; and last but not least, the exhaustion of the Soviet Union's economic resources. The Americans would like us to try to create our own SDI because, in their view, this would put such a huge burden on the Soviet economy that it would collapse under the strain.



The Soviet Union has always found an adequate answer to challenges. The Americans exploded their first atomic bomb in 1945 but their nuclear monopoly stopped soon afterward: In 1947, Academician Kurchatov and his group of scientists announced that they had broken the secret of the atomic bomb, and in 1949, the first experimental Soviet nuclear device was tested. There was no need for even this interval of time in the case of the hydrogen bomb: The Americans carried out the first experiment in 1952 and we followed suit the following year. I could continue the list with the missiles and the strategic bombers. One thing is certain: The Soviet Union restored the power balance by the beginning of the seventies, a balance of power that has been the guarantee of the peaceful coexistence of the two world orders to this very day.

No matter how much the Americans would like us to create our own space shield, we will not do so. There will be no Soviet SDI. We will take countermeasures in two areas:

1. We will neutralize every object of the U.S. space shield — the spacecraft carrying out the aerial survey and ensuring the links with the ground stations, as well as the weapons-carrying craft — by deploying so-called space mines in their orbits, space mines capable of halting and destroying them.

2. We regard it as the most efficient and possibly cheapest solution to increase the arsenal of our existing strategic nuclear weapons and to perfect their technology.

In the course of our countermeasures, therefore, the stress will be on the further development of our strategic arms. Our missiles will be capable of penetrating the U.S. "shield" and, by counterattacking them, of destroying the missiles of the other side. What is more, the implementation of our plan will cost considerably less: According to our scientists, it will cost only 2 percent of the SDI cost.

[Szaniuszlo] According to the plans, the space weapons are to destroy targets with laser beams....

[Morozov] Yes, the laser is the most important component of the strike. The necessary source of energy would be supplied in space by a medium-strength nuclear blast. A nuclear blast in space, however, would violate all the Soviet-U.S. agreements signed so far. This would make the development of a new, third generation of nuclear weapons possible.

[Szaniuszlo] Not long ago, the Soviet Union extended again its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. What was the reaction to this announcement in the Soviet Union?

[Morozov] What could I say about this? The people are worried by the U.S. attitude. Following Mikhail Gorbachev's television speech, IZVESTIYA interviewed several citizens and asked them for their opinions on the extension of the unilateral moratorium. One of the interviewees did not hide his concern: According to him, this step diminishes the defense capability of the Soviet Union because it gives the Americans an advantage. Then, the interviewee recognized the political advantage inherent in the unilateral moratorium.

We must regroup our forces adequately and wait. Wait for the United States to join the moratorium... Look, I, as a colonel of the Soviet Army, as a military expert, as a military historian, and as a citizen, am sure that the United States will come up with a positive decision.

[Szaniawski] You are, therefore, an optimist and hope that the Americans will also announce a moratorium?

[Morozov] I not only hope but I clearly believe that they will join the moratorium, that common sense will prevail after all.

[Szaniawski] And if it does not?

[Morozov] Look, we gave the Americans the possibility to think the whole thing over once again. There is no doubt that they will lose if they continue to stick to their concepts. [paragraph continues]

SDI is wasted money and does not guarantee defense, but the Soviet Union will become free from all the obligations accepted in all the agreements and will be able to continue to freely develop its arsenal both qualitatively and quantitatively.

[Szaniawski] Do you not think that, by promising to implement SDI and threatening to cancel the SALT agreements, the Americans are trying to conduct some sort of war of nerves?

[Morozov] No, I do not think so. They are aware of the fact that we have strong nerves. We stick to our position and will not permit ourselves to be dragged into anything. They were very keen on making us end the moratorium, but we did not do so.

Our proposals are rational because they are aimed at avoiding a nuclear conflict. If a confrontation takes place, there will be no winners and everyone will die. We are in the same boat.... This is precisely the reason why there is need for new attitude in the nuclear age.

[Szaniawski] Thank you for the interview.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### SPANISH GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY STUDYING SDI PARTICIPATION

FN031204 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 31 Aug 86 p 13

[Ignacio Cembrero dispatch: "Madrid Is Studying Agreement With Washington on Its Participation in 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] Brussels — A secret report, drafted at the request of the Prime Minister's Office, advocates the conclusion of a framework agreement between Madrid and Washington on Spain's participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), according to a disclosure by a Spanish civilian source and a military source here. The decreasing interest of President Reagan's administration in securing its European allies' support for its "star wars" project and the disappointing state of research in Spain seem to prompt the Socialist government to promote contacts between Spanish and U.S. enterprises, dispensing with a state-to-state agreement.

In January, the cabinet presided over by Felipe Gonzalez declined to approve or reject the document classified secret DENIM [expansion unknown] No 065-82 submitted to it a month earlier by an interministerial committee. Over 3 years since the announcement of the launching of the SDI, Spain is the only country of importance in Europe to lack an official stance on the issue.

The failure to define an attitude with respect to an initiative which will radically change the West's military security is largely to be explained, in the opinion of diplomatic sources, by the referendum on Spain's participation in NATO. The Socialist government did not wish at that time to reduce its chances of victory by combining that campaign with a debate on the "star wars" controversy.

Defense Minister Narciso Serra in May 1985 announced in Brussels the setting up of the interministerial committee which would fulfill above all the need the respond to the letter he received from his U.S. counterpart Caspar Weinberger which Weinberger had sent 2 months earlier to Madrid and the other allied capitals. Weinberger had invited them to "cooperate in the SDI research program."

In the letter, regarded as secret by the Spanish Administration but published in full by Rafael Bardaji in his book "Star Wars" (Inapps Publishing House), Caspar Weinberger also suggests that he be informed of the national areas of research most in

keeping with the U.S. program, which he proposes to explain to the European friends by organizing meetings in Washington.

In the course of 7 months the deputy directors general of security and defense at the Foreign Ministry, of technological innovation at the Industry Ministry, and of technological innovation and cooperation programs at the Defense Ministry, as well as two experts — a military man with the rank of colonel and a university professor — wrote the most thorough reflection ever conducted in Spain on the SDI and its implications for industry and the national economy.

An assessment of the state of scientific research in the peninsula and several meetings in Washington with those in charge of the SDI, beginning with its top chief, General James A. Abrahamson, prompted the committee to advise in its conclusions that the modernization of the Spanish arms industry's output depends on its involvement in the SDI.

Nevertheless, at the end of the 180 pages of its first volume, the drafters of the report acknowledge that Washington has scant interest in concluding an overall agreement with Madrid similar to those linking it with London and Bonn, except perhaps for political and psychological reasons, and suggest an alternate form of cooperation with the project.

The alternate solution, the document notes, would be to promote contacts between enterprises on both sides of the Atlantic and also to encourage Spanish laboratories to subcontract with other European laboratories in charge of carrying out some subprograms of Reagan's initiative.

The report does not enter into details about the enterprises capable of cooperating, referring for this purpose to the exhaustive report on "New Technologies, Economy, and Society in Spain" drafted shortly before for the Moncloa Palace under the direction of Manuel Castella. The report was published after its military section, written by Javier Melero, had been expunged.

The alternative suggested by the committee seems in fact to be the course surreptitiously advocated by Felipe Gonzalez, when just under a year ago he stated, in short, in Bonn, that enterprises could go further than the government without the latter being

able to do anything to prevent them from taking part in the research plans envisaged by the initiative.

Shortly before, in Beijing, the prime minister emphasized, according to his spokesman, Javier Solana, that the SDI is not the correct way to resolve the problem of disarmament.

Albeit only implicitly, the conclusion of a Spanish-U.S. framework agreement now seems to have been almost ruled out. Satisfied with the agreements reached with its two main European allies, the White House is no longer promising to secure the purely symbolic support which Spain could give it with respect to the USSR by formally endorsing its "star wars" project.

As far as the Spanish Government is concerned, a certain disappointment at the few credits which the European partners solemnly invited to the SDI feast will receive is now added to its initial desire to avoid becoming involved in a new argument about its defense policy.

Narciso Serra, initially an enthusiastic supporter of Spanish cooperation in the project, confessed his skepticism at a symposium organized by the Foundation for Studies on Peace and International Relations in Madrid at the end of May.

According to him, his disenchantment was prompted by his British interlocutors, who at a meeting of NATO's European Independent Planning Group in Brussels expressed their disillusionment at Washington's scant generosity in involving them in the SDI. Britain will be, in financial terms, the main European beneficiary of "star wars."

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C50: 5200/2757

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

FRG'S WOERNER'S UPCOMING U.S. VISIT—Bonn, 26 Aug—Federal Defense Minister Woerner will visit the United States in November. He will remind members of the House of Representatives and the Senate that the agreements with the FRG on the German economy's participation in the SDI project must be observed. Regarding Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's television statement that the moratorium on nuclear weapons tests will be extended to the end of the year, Woerner said in that connection the Soviet Union could not speak about military disadvantages. Since 1971, 315 Soviet nuclear weapons tests had been registered, as compared to no more than 233 U.S. tests, he said. [By "RAN."]  
[Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Aug 86 p 2 DW]  
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CSO: 5200/2754



## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

### TASS ANALYST SAYS NUCLEAR SITUATION WORSENING

LDO42103 Moscow TASS in English 1727 GMT 4 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 4 TASS — TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

In accordance with its program of the elimination of nuclear arms by the year 2000, the Soviet Union placed a package of constructive proposals on the table of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms. These initiatives meet with broad support in the world since they have been worked out not from the position of narrow, egoistic interests, but with taking into account all viewpoints and needs of security of many states. These proposals stem from the realities of the present.

They in Washington stubbornly refuse to recognize officially that nuclear weapons are practically unusable. Washington builds its policy on the permissibility of using nuclear weapons in any situation. THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote on Wednesday that after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, use of nuclear weapons by the USA was a real possibility more than once.

According to the newspaper, every president, from Truman to Reagan, was faced with the need to resolve that question theoretically, and most of them were resolving it practically. In other words, the thread which holds the nuclear "sword of damocles" looming over humanity can be snapped by Washington any time. Is it tolerable that the entire globe should be a hostage to the United States nuclear ambitions?

Talking about the readiness for "flexibility" in the approach to the solution of the problem of strategic arms limitation, the U.S. side actually remains at a standstill in its position since the Geneva meeting. And at that meeting, the sides assumed the commitment to speed up the process of the talks on arms limitation, to take measures for the normalization of Soviet-American relations, improvement of the international situation.

But they in Washington only try to create the impression that there is progress on all these main directions.

In reality, the situation continues worsening. The United States persists with the arms race and passes on to the militarization of near earth and outer space in the framework of the "star wars" program, which is described as SDI. As far as regional conflicts go, the United States is preparing ostentatiously another provocation against Libya, is whipping up war hysteria.

The Soviet Union and its allies oppose all these provocative actions of the USA with a realistic program of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century and of preventing the militarization of space. Meanwhile Washington, resorting to rhetoric, is striving not only to preserve but also build up its nuclear potential, is speeding up the SDI program.

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### MOSCOW HITS U.S. NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT IN TURKEY

LD051017 Moscow in Turkish to Turkey 1300 GMT 4 Sep 86

[Nikolay Pakhlin commentary: "NATO's Dangerous Plans"]

[Summary] NATO Commander in Chief General Rogers recently announced that the number of nuclear weapons in Germany was excessive, and some should be removed. However, Rogers wants to deploy the removed nuclear weapons to Greece or Turkey. Which one? "The U.S. press clearly says it will be Turkey. Washington has a number of important political and geographical factors in mind, above all [word indistinct] of the views of a number of Turkish officials. The statement by Sukru Elekdog, the Turkish ambassador to the United States, to a correspondent of the DEFENSE WEEK at the beginning of July has not gone unnoticed in the United States. The ambassador emphasized that Turkey, by securing one third of the front between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, was making an unparalleled and vitally important contribution to NATO.

"Another fact Washington has in mind is the existence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey. In Washington's view, a country that permits the deployment of nuclear weapons in its territory will easily permit the deployment of another batch of weapons, this time in the shape of nuclear missiles. The deployment of a batch of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey, as being planned by the Pentagon and NATO, can undoubtedly sharpen the political situation in the area where Europe and Asia meet, and will increase tension in the eastern Mediterranean. People in Turkey realize this. Thus, in a statement to GUNES, a representative of the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that at a time when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan are called on to reduce nuclear arms, NATO asks Turkey for additional nuclear undertakings. Besides this, Turkey must behave with maximum care toward its relations with the Soviet Union and should abstain from actions that may harm the developing Soviet-Turkish relations. The Turkish public are also concerned over NATO's dangerous plans, and are justified in detecting the great danger to the national security of Turkey as well as to the national security of other Middle Eastern countries."

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CSO: 5200/1564

**CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**

**U.S.-SOVIET CHEMICAL ARMS TALKS HELD 4-5 SEPTEMBER**

**TASS Report**

**LD051054 Moscow TASS in English 1034 GMT 5 Sep 86**

[Text] Berne September 5 TASS — On September 4 and 5 delegations of the USSR and USA had here the second round of exchanges of opinions under an accord between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. president Ronald Reagan on discussing ways of averting the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Delegation was led by Viktor Israelyan, a member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Soviet delegate to the Disarmament Conference, and the U.S. delegation by John Hawse, deputy assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs.

**Radio Moscow Commentary**

**LD282141 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 28 Aug 86**

**[Commentary by Viktor Ivanov]**

[Text] Soviet-American consultations will continue next week with a view to adopting joint measures to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. Here is a commentary by Viktor Ivanov:

The consultations are to be held next Thursday and Friday in Bern under an agreement reached at the Soviet-American summit in Geneva last November. The summit voiced resolve to press for a general and complete ban on chemical weapons and an agreement on the destruction of chemical weapon stocks. The issue of the nonproliferation of chemical weapons is an aspect of the general problem. The Soviet Union has demonstrated its resolve to reach agreements on both partial measures and the problems as a whole. During the first round of the Soviet-American consultations a measure of progress was achieved and the outcome of the first round can be described as positive on the whole. As Washington has acknowledged officially, neither the Soviet Union nor its allies have made any move running counter to the goal of ensuring the nonproliferation of chemical weapons.

As far as the issue of banning chemical weapons of mass extermination and destroying its stocks is concerned, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been pressing for an appropriate international agreement. In April, the Soviet delegation

to the Geneva Disarmament Conference tabled new proposals accounting for the stand of the Western nations. The proposals provide for banning and destroying all chemical weapon stocks and dismantling the industrial capacity for the manufacture of these weapons. They also provide for effective verification measures, going as far as on-site inspection by international teams of experts. In taking that stand the Soviet Union proceeds from clear-cut plans for abolishing chemical weapons before the turn of the century, spelt out by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement of 15th January. The plans are part of the Soviet program for setting up a comprehensive system of international security, advanced by the 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in the spring.

The Soviet approach to the issue of chemical weapons relies on the principles that guide this country in its policy with respect to disarmament in general. The Soviet Union accounts in its proposals for the points of view and proposals of other nations' governments, as well as public opinion. The principle of equal security is adhered to throughout the proposed arms limitation and disarmament process. The Soviet proposals are open-ended and subject to any discussions aimed at reaching results corresponding to the interests of all parties concerned. The Soviet Union's readiness for a constructive dialogue and its commitment to seeking mutually acceptable formulas are interpreted in certain United States circles and in some of its allies as a result of the military pressure and arms build-up that these nations have been trying to bring to bear on the USSR. Speaking on Soviet television on 18th August, Mikhail Gorbachev warned that this interpretation is wrong and that it does not contribute to reaching agreements in good faith. The Soviet proposals, he said, are not dictated by weakness; they are dictated by the awareness of the great responsibility for the destinies of the human race. The same is true of the Soviet approach to the problem of abolishing chemical weapons.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

FRG HAILS U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS VOTE--Bonn, 14 Aug (DPA)--The decision by the U.S. House of Representatives not to start the production of chemical weapons House of Representatives not to start the production of chemical weapons for the time being is, in the view of the SPD, "a victory for disarmament." The negotiations in the Geneva UN Disarmament Committee will now be receiving a reprieve, said Karsten Voigt, foreign policy spokesman for the SPD Bundestag group, today. The other decisions by the representatives, for an end to [nuclear] tests, and against the testing of antisatellite weapons, also showed that it "is wrong to judge the United States only through the eyes of the Reagan administration," said Voigt. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1319 GMT 14 Aug 86 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/2754



## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### PRAVDA REVIEWS CDE ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS

PM051534 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Sep 86 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent M. Kostikov dispatch carried under the "Main Topic of the Day" rubric and the general heading "Warding Off the Threat of War": "When Time Is at a Premium"]

[Text] Stockholm, September — The Soviet Union's extension of its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions through 1 January 1987, which was announced on the eve of the resumption of work at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, created a particularly favorable international "background" for the achievement of productive results at this final session. Millions of Europeans now rightly expect that the delegations of the 35 participating countries will adopt specific measures to strengthen and develop the all-European process initiated in Helsinki. As M.S. Gorbachev noted in his 18 August statement, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, working in constructive cooperation with other participants in the conference, have already done much to find solutions to such key issues as the nonuse of force, notification of military exercises and troop movements, the exchange of annual plans of military activity, the invitation of observers, and monitoring [proverka].

Indeed, if you look back, it becomes obvious that there has been virtually no session in Stockholm at which the USSR and the other socialist countries have not proposed initiatives advancing the conference's work. Mention should also be made of the businesslike, constructive steps taken by the neutral and nonaligned countries to achieve progress in all areas of work.

The solution of such a long-unresolved problem as notification of air force exercises marked an important step forward. The socialist countries have always consistently advocated notification of all major air force exercises — air forces constitute a modern assault [udarniy] branch of the armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the representatives of the United States and its NATO allies for a long time avoided any discussion of this question, rejecting even the need to formulate it and trying to link notification of air force exercises with the activity of ground forces. However, a compromise was found. Something similar can also be observed with regard to the matter of notification of ground troop exercises. The presence of a common basis, the existing accord that notification should include ground troop exercises conducted jointly with the air force, navy, and amphibious and air assault troops, has not yet led to the adoption of a specific decision on parameters. In this the tactics of linkage chosen by the United States and its desire to bury the implementation of important confidence measures in the military sphere beneath a mass of words are again clearly noticeable.

The problem of limiting the scale of military exercises is an urgent one in Stockholm. The major exercises carried out today by the NATO bloc are undoubtedly destabilizing in character. This is shown by the "Autumn Forge-86" maneuvers, which have now begun over an enormous area stretching from Norway to the Mediterranean and in which more than 200,000 soldiers, enormous quantities of combat hardware, and various navy and air force subunits will be mobilized — thus the demand by most European countries that the scale of military exercises be limited is both just and legitimate.

A positive and specific solution of this issue will substantially increase confidence measures and reduce the risk of having the other side make a wrong assessment and will thereby lower the threshold of likely conflict. This is dictated by the proposals of the socialist countries, proposals which also take account of the stances of the neutral and nonaligned countries, that the notifiable level should not be exceeded by more than five times when military exercises are held. Seeking to lower the extremely dangerous level of military confrontation in Europe, the socialist countries have also put forward an initiative to ban the holding of more than six military exercises whose scale is two or more times above the notifiable level per calendar year.

Despite these still-unresolved items on the Stockholm forum's agenda, progress is clearly becoming more tangible. One more important step — an accord on notification of troops movements in Europe — was taken one week after the present session opened.

Conference participants are now giving pride of place to problems of verification [kontrol] and monitoring [proverka] of the fulfillment of confidence-building measures so that every participating state could allow on-the-spot inspection [inspektziya] on its territory within the continent of Europe on the basis of a quota of 1-2 inspections [inspektziya] per year. It is now up to the NATO countries to respond on this question.

The United States and certain of its allies continue to oppose the achievement of mutually acceptable accords on limiting military activity — that is to say, they oppose any lowering of the threshold of dangerous confrontation. Certainly the NATO representatives in Stockholm have not made any specific proposals on these issues to date.

The speech delivered to the Stockholm conference's plenary session by Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the Soviet General Staff, speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government, has been of great importance for its progress. He drew the delegates' attention to the importance, in today's complicated international conditions, of the conference's successful outcome. The main significance of this fact is that an important improvement in European affairs and international life will have been made. The Soviet Union is demonstrating its desire to achieve agreement by deeds, and it has the right to expect moves in response from the NATO states.

... The Stockholm forum is drawing to its close, it must finish on 19 September. Time is at a premium. Success at the forum would signify an important step toward creating the necessary preconditions for the upcoming all-European meeting in Vienna this fall.

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CSO: 3200/1573

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

POLISH TV INTERVIEWS SOVIET CDE DELEGATE

LD232124 Warsaw PAP in English 1945 GMT 23 Aug 86

[Text] Warsaw, 23 Aug—Following are excerpts from an interview for Polish prime time tv news bulletin by chief Soviet delegate to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Security in Europe, broadcast tonight:

"There is a clear perception of influence of initiatives tabled by the socialist countries at the conference, on many issues: halting the nuclear arms race, elimination of other means of mass destruction, limitation of conventional armaments, chemical weapons and a whole series of other things.

"All over Europe, we perceive increasing impact of and interest in our initiatives. This allows us to work for an agreement in a more determined and decisive way. I believe that these important initiatives will in a large measure enable the conference to make some progress.

"A very important role stays with the initiating steps taken by the Polish delegation led by Wlodzimierz Konarski who has made many proposals dealing with, for instance, solving such an important question as inviting observers to notified military exercises.

"The Polish delegation has tabled a very important compromise on notification of large-scale air force maneuvers. It became possible to settle this question, so the Polish delegation proposed on behalf of all the socialist states to carry the issue of air force activities into the next stage of the conference.

"We are of the opinion that the conference can and should finish its work on 19 September with adopting important and concrete agreements on confidence building measures. Of course, this is not an easy task, but it is feasible," Grinyevsky concluded.

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CSO: 5200/1573

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### USSR JOURNAL ON WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS

AU250611 Moscow MEZHEDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 8, August 1986 (signed to press 23 Jul 86) pp 13-19

[Article by Yu. Tomilin: "Program of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms Reduction"]

[Text] A substantial result of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states (Budapest, 10-11 June 1986) was the further accord of these states' stances and actions on the basic problems of current politics. The joint initiative of a large-scale reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—was particularly important. This initiative is set forth in the special appeal by Warsaw Pact member-states to NATO member-states and all European countries. The new proposals considerably supplement and consolidate the program of the total elimination of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons. As M.S. Gorbachev stated at the June (1986) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, they "are a major contribution by socialist countries to the struggle for improving the international situation."

Strengthening European security is a basic problem of contemporary international relations. It was precisely in the Old World that both world wars began. The European continent was the main theater of operations in these wars. As a result, the main losses and destruction fell to the lot of the countries located there.

And now the threat of a conflict beginning in this region of the world is very great. It is precisely here that two worlds, two societies with different socioeconomic systems come into contact with each other. Two mighty groups of armed forces, armed with the most modern and most destructive types of arms, stand face to face in Europe. Besides nuclear weapons, they have the most refined tanks, missiles, and aircraft, not to mention all kinds of small arms. These so-called conventional arms are being constantly updated, are becoming increasingly refined and powerful, and in their combat characteristics are approaching mass destruction weapons.

There is an approximate balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in armed forces strength and the ratio of conventional arms. This, of course, does not mean total balance in the number of divisions and arms. Each of the side's armed forces has its own structure and its own organization. It is necessary



to consider these features in calculating the correlation of forces. A purely arithmetic, oversimplified approach will not provide the real picture. For instance, the armed forces of Western countries have, besides servicemen, a large number of civilian personnel (the FRG—180,000 people, Great Britain—315,000, and the United States—about 1 million people). In the Soviet Armed Forces similar posts are occupied by servicemen. The numerical strength of divisions is different: army divisions of Warsaw Pact countries number a maximum of 11-12,000 men, while the strength of a deployed [razvernutyaya] American division is 16-19,000 and of an FRG division—more than 20,000 men.

Western propaganda is trying in every way possible to propagate a version that Warsaw countries have "superiority" over NATO both in the numerical strength of armed forces and the numbers of separate types of conventional arms. With the help of this version it tries to validate the need to build up arms—nuclear and conventional. It stresses, for instance, that Warsaw Pact countries have more divisions, tanks, and aircraft.

Indeed, the total number of ground-forces divisions in the USSR is greater than in the United States. But this is quite natural, because in view of its geographic and strategic location, the Soviet Union is forced to provide a defense not only in Europe but also in other regions. The total length of the USSR's state borders amounts to about 67,000 km, including more than 20,000 km of land. This border must be safeguarded and defended both in the west—from the threat by NATO—in the east, and in the south—taking into account the American Armed Forces there, the armies of their military allies and of other countries.

As regards Europe, the 94 NATO divisions (including France and Spain) there confront only 78 divisions from Warsaw Pact countries, moreover, as noted above, the numerical strength of Warsaw Pact divisions is more than a factor of 1.5 less than the numerical strength of similar NATO formations.

The correlation of forces between the North Atlantic bloc and the Warsaw Pact in the sphere of tactical aviation is also about the same. Striving to prove the Warsaw Pact Organization's superiority in this sphere, representatives of the West only pick out certain indicators in which the Warsaw Pact exceeds NATO. Thus, the North Atlantic bloc is inferior to the Warsaw Pact Organization in the number of fighter-interceptors, but then has a certain numerical superiority in fighter-bombers and ground-attack aircraft. On the whole, as noted in the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces to Congress (1984), the correlation of the sides' air forces in Europe is more or less stable.

There is a similar attempt to validate the myth about the so-called tank threat from the USSR. There are now more than 17,000 tanks in the forces of the countries that comprise the North Atlantic bloc. Moreover, about 3,000 American and 5,000 tanks of the West European NATO countries are concentrated at depots in Europe. This number approximately corresponds to the tank forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The West resorts to various devices to misrepresent the picture of the correlation of forces. Thus, it does not take into account the armed forces of Spain



and France and the National Guard and the organized reserve formations of the United States. Only the arms of regular troops in peacetime, without reserve components, are counted among the assets of the NATO Armed Forces. Depot reserves, particularly of tanks, are not considered. The number of tactical aviation aircraft on the Warsaw Pact side are overstated by including air defense aircraft in the "attack" capability. Calculations of the number of ground-forces divisions include those that could not be used to begin military operations without taking additional mobilization measures, although it is quite obvious that for a correct representation of the correlation of the sides' armed forces, it is necessary to compare their existing combat-ready divisions.

Actually, this is the correlation of forces in Europe: The NATO block exceeds the Warsaw Pact in the total numerical strength of personnel, in the number of combat-ready divisions, in antitank systems, and has an approximately equal quantity of artillery and armored equipment. The North Atlantic bloc has superiority in fighter-bombers, for which the Warsaw Pact compensates by a somewhat greater number of air defense fighter-interceptors. On the whole, there is an approximate balance of forces in conventional arms.

Dealing with the Western thesis of Western Europe's need for nuclear weapons, including American ones, to "deter" the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, while addressing the 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany on 18 April 1986, stressed that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would create a new situation not only for the West, but also for us. He said: "We cannot forget that invasions of our territory in the prenuclear age were carried out--incidentally, time and again--from a western direction." In the same address he stated: "Never, under any circumstances will our country begin military operations against Western Europe, unless we and our allies become a target for attack by NATO!"

This stance was reinforced by a new initiative dealing with conventional arms and armed forces. Announced by the Soviet Union on 18 April, it then became the basis of the Appeal of Warsaw Pact Member-States to the NATO Member-States and all European Countries Concerning a Program for Armed Forces and Conventional Arms Reduction in Europe.

What does this program propose?

The point is to substantially reduce all components of ground forces and tactical assault aviation of the European states, as well as the corresponding forces and weapon systems of the United States and Canada deployed in Europe. Along with conventional arms, operational-tactical nuclear arms with a range (radius of action) of up to 1,000 km would also be subject to reduction. We remind you that in accordance with the program to eliminate nuclear weapon advanced on 15 January 1986, the Soviet Union proposed to begin reduction of these nuclear arms in its second phase; that is, after 1990. In the case of the Budapest proposals being accepted, reduction of operational-tactical nuclear arms could begin earlier.

It is proposed that the geographic zone for reductions encompass the entire territory of Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals. Reductions of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe would take place—in accordance with the Budapest proposals—gradually, according to agreed-upon time frames, while constantly observing a military balance at lower levels without detriment to anyone's security. Along with the formations and units being reduced, their organic weapons, including nuclear weapon systems, would also be reduced.

It is proposed to establish the total volume of reductions as approximately 25 percent compared to the current level. This would amount to more than half a million people from each side. Given the reciprocal readiness of the North Atlantic bloc countries, this result could be achieved as soon as the early nineties by carrying out corresponding reductions in the land forces and tactical assault aviation of both alliances in Europe. The participants in the Budapest conference advocated that the process of reducing the armed forces and arms of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries also continue in the future.

As an initial step it is proposed to conduct, within 1 or 2 years, a one-time mutual reduction of the numerical strength of the forces of the opposing military-political alliances' states by 100-150,000 men from each side. The reduction of tactical assault aviation would be of major importance within the framework of this measure.

Although the proposal talks about a 25-percent reduction in the armed forces and arms of the two military-political alliances, it is also planned to involve other European states in this process. This possibility would arise as a result of substantial reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces and arms.

The components of armed forces being reduced would be disbanded by equivalent integral military formations, units, and subunits along with their organic arms and combat equipment. Their personnel would be demobilized according to procedures established in each state.

The arms and equipment being reduced must be destroyed or stored within national territories according to agreed-upon procedures. As regards nuclear weapons, they would be destroyed. At the same time certain types of military equipment, by arrangement, could be turned over to be used for peaceful purposes.

The Budapest appeal makes a special proviso that the funds saved as a result of the appropriate reduction in armed forces and conventional arms must not be channeled into creating new types of weapons or other military purposes. They must be used for the needs of economic and social development.

The appeal proposes that all states involved in an agreement on armed forces and arms reduction make a commitment not to increase ground forces and tactical assault aviation outside the reduction zones. The need for this commitment is produced by the following circumstances: First, the territories of three of the parties to an agreement are totally (the United States and Canada) or partially (the Soviet Union) outside the reduction zone. Second, some of the

states whose territories are totally within the reduction zone have armed forces outside Europe. Increasing the extra-European armed forces and arms of the parties to an agreement, on the one hand, would lead to an increase in military danger in other world regions and, on the other, would increase the danger of a recommitment of the armed forces and arms to Europe in violation of the agreement.

The participants in the Budapest conference propose working out a procedure for reducing armed forces and conventional arms in which the reduction process would lessen the danger of a sudden attack and would promote a consolidation of military-strategic stability on the European continent. For this purpose there should be agreement on a significant reduction in the tactical assault aviation of both military-political alliances in Europe, as well as a decrease in the concentration of forces along the line of contact of these alliances.

For this purpose it is also necessary to develop and implement additional measures capable of strengthening the conviction of Warsaw Pact and NATO countries and of all European states that sudden offensive operations will not be launched against them. Accords are envisaged on limitations on holding large military exercises (as regards their number and scale), on an exchange of more detailed information about them, including the forces and weapons brought from other regions into Europe for the period of the exercises, as well as on other measures that would promote mutual confidence-building. Talks are now being held at the Stockholm conference on this score.

The implementation of measures such as the creation on the continent of zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons, a gradual reduction in the military activities of both military alliances, and the establishment of cooperation between their participants on arms limitation and disarmament issues would promote confidence-building and the creation of more favorable conditions for armed forces and arms reduction in Europe. Under these conditions the GDR and Czechoslovakia propose beginning the process of freeing Europe from chemical weapons with its central region--the FRG, GDR, and Czechoslovakia. The Warsaw Pact member-states advocate the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones in northern Europe and in the Balkans. Their positive attitude toward the Swedish proposal of creating a so-called nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe is well known (they propose that this corridor be 500-600 km wide).

The issues of how to carry out monitoring [proverka] of the fulfillment of an agreement on armed forces and conventional arms reduction is important. The Warsaw Pact member-states propose that both national technical systems and international procedures, including on-site inspections [inspektsiya], be used for this monitoring. Such a system would ensure reliable and effective verification [kontrol].

Along with measures to verify [kontrol] the process of reduction itself, it is proposed to institute observation of the military activities of the forces that remain after reductions.

Adequate forms of monitoring [proverka] the fulfillment of measures for mutual confidence-building in accordance with agreements would also be used.



To carry out verification [kontrol], the sides will exchange, at an agreed-upon moment, data on the total numerical strength of the ground forces and the tactical assault aviation in the reduction zone and, separately, on the part of them that is subject to reduction and that remains after reduction, and lists (rosters) of military formations being reduced (disbanded), indicating their designation, numerical strength, deployment, and the number of agreed-upon types of arms subject to reduction. Notification of the commencement and completion of reductions would be given.

For verification [kontrol] purposes, an international consultative commission would be established with the involvement of representatives of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, as well as interested neutral, nonaligned, and other European states.

On-site verification [kontrol] of armed forces and arms reduction and of the destruction or storage of arms could be carried out, when necessary, with the involvement of representatives of the international consultative commission. For this verification, checkpoints manned by representatives of the international consultative commission would be created at major railway terminals, at airfields, and in ports.

The question arises of where the proposals of the Warsaw Pact member-states could be discussed. On this score the appeal puts forward a number of variants.

The proposals on armed forces and conventional arms reduction in Europe could be a subject for concrete discussion at the second phase of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. As you know, the first phase is now under way. It should be completed by November this year, when a meeting of the representatives of the states taking part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will be held in Vienna. It is planned that the second phase of the Stockholm conference will begin after this.

At the same time, proceeding on the basis of the urgency of adopting measures to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe, the Warsaw Pact member-states consider that examination of these proposals could begin immediately. For this purpose they consider it possible to convene a special forum consisting of European states, the United States, and Canada.

They are also ready to expand the framework of the Vienna talks on mutual armed forces and arms reduction in central Europe by involving other European states in them and by changing the mandate of the talks accordingly.

Declaring their readiness to use all possible channels and forums for mutually decreasing the level of military confrontation on a European scale, the participants in the Budapest conference at the same time confirmed their interest in arms and armed forces reduction in central Europe and again advocated a successful conclusion to the first phase of the Stockholm conference.

The issue of military doctrines is of considerable importance in assessing the real intentions of military-political groups and of separate states. The Warsaw Pact member-states declared in Budapest that never, under any circumstances would they begin military operations against any state, be it in Europe

or another world region, unless they themselves become the target of aggression. The proposals they advance stem from their consistent policy aimed at eliminating the military threat and creating a stable and secure peace, and from the defensive nature of their military doctrine, which presupposes maintaining the balance of military forces at the lowest possible level and reducing military capabilities to sufficient limits necessary for defense.

The participants in the Budapest conference stressed that their proposals on armed forces and conventional arms reduction in Europe, being a weighty supplement to the program of eliminating mass destruction weapons, are at the same time of an independent nature. They do not make any preliminary conditions for beginning a substantive discussion of their proposals. The Warsaw Pact member-states have made it clear that they are also ready to examine, in a constructive spirit, other proposals on this score that may be advanced by NATO member-states or neutral, nonaligned, or other European states.

The program of armed forces and conventional arms reduction in Europe advanced by the participants of the Budapest conference of the Political Consultative Committee was positively received throughout the world. It is indicative that the West did not deem it possible to dismiss these proposals out of hand. Moreover, the NATO leadership and official representatives of certain Western countries reacted to them very quickly. This reaction boiled down to statements that the new proposals would be thoroughly studied and would be taken into account in "NATO's further efforts to reduce nonnuclear forces in Europe." Precisely this was the substance of an official statement made on behalf of Carrington, secretary general of the North Atlantic bloc. U.S. Secretary of State Shultz noted the newness of the Budapest proposals.

Many Western commentators, drawing attention to the quickness of the reaction by the NATO leadership and Western countries, interpreted it as an endeavor to anticipate, as much as possible, the impact of the Warsaw Pact member-states' new proposals on the West European public. Some responses have openly expressed the fear that the Budapest proposals will put NATO countries "on the defensive" in the issue of conventional arms and armed forces.

On the whole, positive assessments of the Budapest proposals prevail in Western Europe. Noted is the consistency of the Warsaw Pact member-states' policy on issues of preventing war and decreasing tension on the European continent and throughout the world. W Brandt, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, in a special press statement welcomed the new proposals by the Warsaw Pact member-states and called for a thorough analysis of them.

Not daring to openly sully the new proposals advanced in Budapest, the NATO leadership and the Western powers are nonetheless conducting a policy which can in no way be called constructive. The same Carrington, literally a few days after his first reaction to the Budapest proposals, adopted a posture that in no way accords with the intention to "thoroughly analyze and consider" the constructive proposals by Warsaw Pact member-states. Speaking in Brussels on 20 June, he persistently appealed to NATO members for a further race in the conventional arms sphere and for the creation of new, more destructive forms of these arms.



At the same time, items began appearing in the American press and in a number of West European publications which cannot be considered other than as an attempt to belittle the new proposals on armed forces and conventional arms reduction. The thesis of the need for unequal reductions, which boils down to the Warsaw Pact member-states having to reduce their arms in a larger proportion than NATO member-states, is again being spread in every way possible. The "complexity" of carrying out armed forces reductions on a European scale is talked about.

This stance in no way leads to the untying of complicated political knots. The goal of contemporary diplomacy should be the establishment of mutual understanding. Everyone will stand to gain from this. "This," M.S. Gorbachev stressed at the dinner in honor of F. Mitterrand, president of the French Republic, "primarily affects Europe, for which not only nuclear war is fatally dangerous. There are more than 150 nuclear reactors and hundreds of chemical plants on European territory. And a few conventional artillery shells are enough to destroy a reactor and take many human lives. In any variant--conventional or unconventional--armed conflict would become a detonator of a world catastrophe."

The new important initiative by the Warsaw Pact member-states paves the way. Lower the levels of military confrontation in Europe, create a more stable and settled atmosphere there, and decrease the threat of war breaking out--the interests not only of the peoples of Europe but also of the whole world require this.

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CSO: 5200/1569

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### SOVIET ON-SITE MILITARY INSPECTION OFFER WELCOMED

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1529 GMT 20 Aug 86

[Text] The Foreign Office today welcomed the Soviet Union's offer to allow foreign on-site inspection of its military bases.

An official said it had always regarded on-site inspection as an essential component of any agreement at the current Stockholm Security Conference. "It now appears that the Soviet Union shares that view." He added: "We therefore hope this latest move has opened the way for rapid progress in Stockholm not only on the important issue of inspection arrangements but also on other key issues still outstanding in the conference." These included notification and observation of military activities, he added.

Liberal leader Mr David Steel said it would be "rank hypocrisy" on the part of the West not to welcome the move wholeheartedly". [quotation marks as received] It should also accept and match the Soviet Union's call for a nuclear test moratorium.

Shadow Defence Secretary Mr Denzil Davies welcomed the government's response to the Soviet initiative. But he added: "It is a pity ministers did not react as warmly to the Soviet extension of their nuclear test ban. It is deeply disappointing that the British Government is still holding out against a comprehensive test ban and gives the spurious excuse that it could not be verified."

He went on: "The government's failure to react positively heightens the suspicion that Mrs Thatcher does not want a test ban because, if there was one immediately, then the government could not pack off its scientists and military personnel to Nevada to test the new nuclear warhead for the Trident system."

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CSO: 5240/078

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### BRIEFS

FRG ENVOY TO GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE—Ambassador Henning Wegener, who has headed the Federal Republic's delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference for 5 years, will be replaced by Paul Joachim von Stuelpnagel, who has been head of the Department on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation and Space Problems in the Foreign Ministry. Wegener has been appointed associate secretary general for political affairs at NATO headquarters in Brussels. [By "WY."] [Excerpt] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Aug 86 p 4 DW] /6091

SOVIET-AUSTRIAN CSCE TALKS—Moscow, 9 Sep (TASS)—First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Anatoliy Kavalev today received the head of Austria's delegation to the coming Vienna meeting of representatives of the states, parties to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ambassador Rudolf Torovskiy, who came to Moscow for consultations at the USSR Foreign Ministry on preparation for the Vienna meeting. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 9 Sep 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1573

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### MOSCOW TV INTERVIEWS ABC'S DONALDSON ON NUCLEAR TESTS

LDO92305 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 9 Sep 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video interview with ABC correspondent Sam Donaldson by Vladimir Pozner, "political observer of central television and all-union radio"; Pozner conducts interview from a studio in Moscow; Donaldson responds from a studio in Washington; date not given]

[Text] The Reagan administration is refusing to join the moratorium on nuclear tests. Why? Over to Vladimir Pozner, political observer of central television and all-union radio.

[Pozner] Very likely, it was this same question that the RUDE PRAVO correspondent was interested in when he had his interview with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. A precise and capacious answer was given. In essence, all of the administration's arguments were discussed and, in my opinion, they were convincingly debunked. Not long before that event I invited Sam Donaldson, White House correspondent of the U.S. ABC television company, to answer some questions from central television. It seems to me that this interview well illustrates some of the tenets that were contained in Comrade Gorbachev's replies.

First of all, I asked Mr Donaldson to explain to Soviet viewers the U.S. position with regard to the nuclear moratorium.

[Begin recording] [Donaldson — in English with superimposed Russian translation; video shows Donaldson] You know, U.S. officials have frequently said that the United States must continue tests as, in their opinion, the USSR has already completed a series of tests necessary to modernize its weapons, while we have not yet completed our modernization series. Therefore, if we were to stop our tests now we would be at a distinct disadvantage. [video shows two television sets with Donaldson on one and Pozner on the other, with captions indicating that Donaldson is in Washington and Pozner in Moscow; they converse in English with superimposed translation]

[Pozner] You know, I must say that if, in spite of the fact that the United States has carried out very nearly 20 tests to none by the USSR this calendar year, and has carried out altogether 225 tests more than the USSR, it is still behind, it is clear that there is something wrong with U.S. equipment. There is no other way that one can understand how that could be. By the way, let us look at some other arguments which are of interest to us. It is now being asserted that for its security — the United States keeps repeating this — it is essential to test its stockpile of nuclear weapons. They say that if these are not tested then the strength of the retaliatory strike and consequently security might suffer. Please, could you enlarge on that?

[Donaldson] Well, although I am not a nuclear scientist, Mr Pozner, I am told, and this seems to be so, that after a certain time in storage nuclear weapons can fall into disrepair. Experts assert that it is necessary from time to time to carry out tests of such weapons in order to check on the strength of our retaliatory strike.

[Pozner] I say this is because of the press conference held a few days ago in Moscow at which a major scientist, Academician Vitaliy Goldanskiy, explained in detail, but in a way everyone could understand, why nuclear tests are not necessary to check the state of nuclear weapons. We, too, need to know that our means of retaliatory strike are combat-ready, but if we can check them without tests one must think that you can, too. It would be interesting to me to know if you heard anything about that press conference, as you, as a political journalist, need to know the ins and outs of everything. You must know...

[Donaldson, interrupting] No, I do not know. I am afraid you are asking the wrong person, Mr Pozner.

[Pozner] All right, I beg your pardon. What would you say then about the following argument: Some of you say that it is not the tests which are terrible but nuclear weapons themselves. Therefore, there must be talk about reducing these weapons and not about banning the testing.

[Donaldson] - We are indeed talking about reducing nuclear weapons. This is the essence of the last round of the Geneva talks, what we call SALT — reduction of strategic armaments. [Donaldson uses english word SALT, but the Russian translation uses "sokrashcheniye," reduction, not "organicheniye," limitation] President Reagan very much wants a reduction. Moreover, his aim is reduction to zero. But this must be to mutual satisfaction; it must verifiable; it must proceed by reducing those weapons, that equipment, those carriers and platforms which both sides possess.

[Pozner] No one doubts that. We must think about the security of the other side. It must be equal. We must take your interests into consideration and you must take ours into consideration. But that is not the point. Does it not seem to you that an all-embracing ban on nuclear tests would be an extremely important step, provided there is checking [kontrol] and verification [proverka] that both sides are observing, not violating, it, so to say. Do you not think that this would be a very important step along the path toward the key point, toward solving it — that is, toward nuclear disarmament.

[Donaldson] A comprehensive test ban that was verifiable would be a positive and important step for both sides that had achieved — and I stress this — parity not only in weapons but in technology. And who had reached agreement — and I think this is also important — to reduce nuclear arsenals and put the brake on the arms race.

[Pozner] I would like to thank you for taking part in our broadcast. Thank you. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/1571



## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST BAN EXTENSION BRINGS REACTION

Foreign Office 'Regret'

Paris AFP in English 2244 GMT 18 Aug 86

[Text] London, Aug 18 (AFP) — The British Foreign Office, reacting to Moscow's extension of a Soviet nuclear test ban Monday, expressed "regret" over "such unilateral approaches" and called on Moscow to respond to "Western initiatives" at the disarmament talks in Geneva.

In a statement published after Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced an extension until January 1 of the unilateral ban which has already been extended several times, the Foreign Office said: "We regret the Soviet Union has concentrated its efforts on such unilateral approaches."

It added: "We would much prefer it if these efforts had been concentrated on the various Western initiatives at the conference on disarmament in Geneva, designed to deal with the real problems of verification which would bring progress towards a comprehensive ban."

### Zamyatin News Conference

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1234 GMT 21 Aug 86

[By political reporter David Bradshaw]

[Text] The Soviet Union today stepped up its propaganda offensive over its latest arms control initiatives.

Britain and the United States were both directly challenged by the Soviet ambassador in London, Mr Leonid Zamyatin, to join the Soviet nuclear test ban.

At a specially arranged press conference, he set out to gain the maximum political advantage from the Soviet announcement that it was extending its unilateral nuclear test ban until the end of the year.

Mr Zamyatin said the Soviet Union was paying both military and economic costs for its move but believed it was vital to help "accelerate the elimination of nuclear weapons".

Expressing "deep concern and alarm" at the U.S. reaction to the announcement, he said: "Political will and state wisdom is required in Washington in order to renounce the arms race and give up attempts to gain one-sided nuclear advantage."

Mr Zamyatin made clear that the signing of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would be at the top of the Soviet agenda for the forthcoming summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mr Mikhail Gorbachev.

He ridiculed the Foreign Office response that unilateral actions of this kind were not the most helpful way to bring about a test ban.

The Soviet Union was prepared to enter into discussions over a nuclear test ban with both the United States and Britain, he said.

However, the Foreign Office tonight remained unimpressed with the Soviet move. A spokesman would not comment on the press conference but said: "Our general position remains that unilateral moves such as this are not the best way to bring about progress towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban."

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CSO: 5240/080

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### IZVESTIYA CITES NONALIGNED 'SIX' ON TEST BAN

PM150845 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 5

[APN correspondents V. Dunayev and K. Khachaturov interviews with Argentine President Raul Alfonsin, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu under the heading "Saving the Planet From Destruction" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] At IZVESTIYA's request, APN special correspondents V. Dunayev and K. Khachaturov asked the participants in the summit meeting held in the Mexican city of Ixtapa: "The Soviet Union highly appraises the initiatives put forward by the leaders of the 'Delhi Six' countries in favor of the cause of peace and disarmament. What steps, in your opinion, must primarily be taken today to reduce international tension and save our planet from a terrible catastrophe?" The replies given by the six countries' leaders are published below.

#### Argentine President Raul Alfonsin:

The arms race has formed a vicious circle into which not only the nuclear powers but the whole of mankind have been drawn. The instruments for waging war are becoming increasingly sophisticated and more and more resources-- which could to some extent improve the situation in developing countries-- are being invested in the arms race.

This vicious circle must be broken in order to open the way to peace. As a first step, the "Delhi Six" has put forward the demand that nuclear tests be stopped and the militarization of space prevented. We insist on the implementation of these demands, because they are immediate, practical steps in the sphere of curtailing the arms race.

For our part we offer assistance in creating the corresponding verification mechanism, which could help to more rapidly resolve these tasks.

The "Delhi Six" calls on the public in its own countries and throughout the world to rally together in the struggle for peace and disarmament.

**Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi:**

Nuclear weapons are a crime against humanity and should be qualified precisely as such. Our declaration contains an appeal to conclude a binding international agreement that would outlaw any use of nuclear weapons. In light of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have jointly stated that their aim is to eliminate nuclear weapons, we expect them to put their signature to this pledge. A moratorium on nuclear tests, which would be followed by a total ban on nuclear tests, would be a far-reaching step in the right direction.

In response to our appeal, the Soviet Union unilaterally introduced a moratorium on nuclear tests and has twice extended it. We praise the Soviet Union and highly value the responsibility it is showing.

Unfortunately, nuclear tests are still going on. It is claimed that a ban on nuclear tests is impracticable in the absence of a verification mechanism which would inspire confidence. That is why our six countries have submitted the proposal to assume responsibility for the verification of a future moratorium.

While the nuclear arsenal is building up on earth, attempts are being made to take nuclear weapons into space. Outer space is the common property of all mankind. We cannot tacitly agree to its becoming private property and being used for the purpose of destroying earth. Weapons in space would irrevocably increase the danger.

**Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid:**

As already noted in the 22 May 1984 statement and the 28 January 1985 Delhi declaration, we, the heads of six states and governments participating in the meeting for peace and disarmament, believe that constructive dialogue and the establishment of contacts between the two largest nuclear powers is one of the most important steps on the way to reducing international tension and preventing a nuclear catastrophe on our planet. We are deeply convinced that only dialogue will help to achieve agreement on the question of curtailing the arms race and ultimately completely eliminating nuclear weapons.

We also stress that it is precisely the absence of contacts that gives rise to lack of understanding, which develops into international tension, which in its turn affects the interests of all peoples. Proceeding from this, we urge both nuclear powers to demonstrate firm political will at the Geneva negotiating table and to take a step forward in the struggle to eliminate the threat of a world catastrophe.

In this connection we state that stopping all nuclear weapon tests is a basic condition for successful disarmament talks. It is precisely for this reason that we appeal to the USSR and the United States to announce a moratorium on all nuclear tests in order to reach a definitive accord on a total ban on such tests.

On the other hand we, the participants in the meeting, believe that it is also essential to draw the attention of the international public to the struggle for

peace and disarmament. At present these two problems are the most topical both for all peoples as a whole and for each individual inhabitant on earth. Achieving our basic aim--striving for peace and security--will depend completely and utterly on the degree to which mankind is aware of the danger of the arms race and the need for disarmament.

Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere:

The problem of nuclear disarmament concerns us all. We know that a nuclear war would be fatal to all mankind and we are here because we have a right to live. We cannot allow the problem of peace to be monopolized by just a few countries. We must all be involved in resolving this problem. And one of the basic aims of our group's activity is precisely to draw the attention of the broad world public to the problem of preserving peace, because if war should break out we would all be its victims and there would be security for no one on earth.

Activating public opinion in "Third World" countries is far more complex because, first, our mass information media are not sufficiently effective and, second, some of our compatriots are illiterate. But we must try to do this by using all of our available potential and mass information media, and also the activity of groups, individuals, political parties, and women's, youth, and labor unions.

And another circumstance in this connection. I attended a conference of prominent public figures in Ixtapa. Our friends from the United States told us, for example, that in their country little is known of the fact that the Soviet Union has declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. I think the White House knows about it.

Political leaders well understand the leading role played by the mass information media, but they do not exploit this possibility to inform the American people of events. We draw the attention of our friends to this fact and say to them: You must do something in this direction, you must contribute to activating U.S. public opinion, because it is my personal belief that a basic decision on the disarmament issue must now be taken in the United States. And this decision will only be taken when the U.S. Administration--the present one or another--understands that it can in no way ignore public opinion.

Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson:

The first step on the way to reducing international tension must be that of overcoming the barrier of mistrust between the great powers in the West and the East, which must begin serious talks on far-reaching, urgent disarmament measures, as decided at the Geneva summit meeting in November last year. Consequently, I am in favor of a new summit meeting being held as soon as possible between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and President R. Reagan which would lead to important results in this sphere.

With regard to specific immediate measures which must be taken, as is well known, the "Delhi Six" have repeatedly spoken in favor of stopping all nuclear tests, at least for the period until the next summit meeting.



By taking this most simple step as soon as possible, the nuclear powers will be able to demonstrate to the world their serious intention to stop the arms race. This will also create a favorable climate for serious talks in Geneva and will be able to clear the way for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests.

Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou:

At the present moment the most important step is to stop nuclear tests and to back this up with an appropriate verification system.

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CSO: 5200/1571

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### USSR: DOMESTIC BACKING FOR MORATORIUM EXTENSION

#### TASS on Public Support

LD241746 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 24 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow August 24 TASS--The statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev is the call for peace and at the same time the appeal to action by all peace-minded forces of the globe. The extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions is the gesture of a country which is confident in its strength and which knows the price of war, Soviet people say.

A mass demonstration of youth under the watchword "Let us Preserve Peace on Earth" was held in the capital of Tajikistan. The march which passed through the squares and streets of Dushanbe involved more than 5,000 people, among them, cultural workers and scientists, students, schoolchildren and foreign guests.

The move to prolong the freeze on nuclear testing is one more striking and cogent example of our restraint and strength, of the realistic policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, whose goal is not to allow thermonuclear catastrophe, to preserve peace, said I. Makhmudov, turning of a fixtures producing plant.

The participants in the demonstration adopted an address to their American coevals, to youth across the world to state a resolute "no" to the militarist course of the Washington administration.

Rallies in support of the statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee were held on ships of the Far-Eastern Sea Shipping Line and the All-Union Commercial Fishing Association "Dalryba".

A report coming in from the motor ship "Putyatyn" reads: "The crew wholeheartedly approves of the extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear blast until January 1, 1987".

"Approve and support"--say radio messages sent to Vladivostok from the crews of the floating base "Spasak", the tuna fishing fleet "Leninsky Luch", the motor ship "Toboless", the transport refrigerating factory ship "Vostochny Bereg" and of many other vessels.

Thousands of the residents of Baku, Azerbaijan, attended a meeting in support of the peace initiatives put forward by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev.

"The threat of the third world war is real but not inevitable", S. Vezirov, operator of the oil and gas producing department named after S. Serebrovskiy, said at the meeting. "It is deplorable that the U.S. Administration does not want to follow the example of our country".

Letter by Academician

PM221226 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 1

[Letter from Hero of Socialist Labor Academician A. Trofimuk, first deputy chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department, under the general heading "One Planet for All": "I Believe in Commonsense"]

[Text] Novosibirsk--I returned the other day from a long trip around Siberia and I am now full of the impressions gained from my new encounter with our marvelous country. You cannot but be carried away by the expanse of the green taiga, the powerful deep rivers, and the vast lakes. Everything there is majestic and beautiful.

And while beholding all that beauty it suddenly occurred to me that millions and billions of years were required to create it, but it could be destroyed by a simple nuclear strike... No, that must not be allowed.

Even thinking about nuclear war is monstrous.

That is why the extension of the nuclear test moratorium declared by our country is being seen as yet another extremely important step toward assuring the security of all mankind.

At international scientific congresses and at meetings with American colleagues and scientists from other countries we have frequently discussed the problem of peace on our planet. And in so doing full mutual understanding has been revealed. Irrespective of their political views and convictions, scientists readily agreed that conflicts cannot be resolved by the use of nuclear weapons.

Scientists can envisage better than anyone else the consequences of a nuclear strike in all its tragic detail. That is why I am deeply convinced that the new initiative put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev will be supported by progressive scientists in all countries. And I would like to hope that they will do their utmost to ensure that tests and subsequently the production of nuclear weapons and all kinds of weapons of mass destruction are banned.

It is difficult to imagine that the American leaders are unaware of the utter gravity of the world situation. But the peace-loving peoples see no real steps on their part toward reducing international tension. And the situation is now such that these questions can no longer be deferred. The times demand resolute action to ensure peace and mankind's future.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement is evidence of our country's strength. It is helping rid mankind of the risk of death in a nuclear catastrophe.

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES CHIEF ON EFFECTS OF MORATORIUM

LD042204 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Sep 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Army General Yu. P. Maksimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces and USSR deputy defense minister by unidentified correspondent; date and place not given -- recorded]

[Text] The extension of the moratorium on nuclear testing in the USSR continues to remain at the focus of attention of Soviet people and the world public. Here is our interview.

[Correspondent] The aim in life that Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Maksimov has chosen for himself is a strengthening of the defense capability of our country. In the post of commander-in-chief [of the Strategic Rocket Forces] he now occupies his aim is to enhance the combat readiness of the Soviet strategic missiles.

How in this regard does he assess the extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing? Such was the first question of the interview.

[Maksimov] The unilateral moratorium is not a simple thing for the Soviet Union, particularly in conditions where the United States is insistently striving to achieve a decisive military superiority. This striving requires that we adopt the appropriate countermeasures to rule out any disruption of the strategic nuclear parity, in particular by improving nuclear missile weapons and enhancing their reliability and efficiency. However, nuclear testing is necessary for this purpose. Testing is in no way less important to us than it is to the Americans. For over a year now no nuclear explosions have been conducted in the Soviet Union, and the claims by the U.S. Administration that this is not having any particular effect on the Russian' military program can in no way be acknowledged as conscientious ones.

[Correspondent] What is your attitude toward their claim that they have fallen behind in the improvement of nuclear missile systems?

[Maksimov] Just since we introduced the moratorium, they have conducted 18 nuclear explosions, pushing ahead with the development of new types of nuclear weapons. For example, 10 new MX missiles are already being put into position. Each of these missiles carries 10 warheads with an aggregate yield of about 6,000 kilotons, which is 200 times greater than the yield of the atom bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. The placing on alert duty of the MX missile, which possesses a high combat-readiness accuracy in striking its target and other high-level characteristics, is evidence that this missile has been developed to a sufficient degree. Well, at any rate one cannot

speak of the existence of any backwardness in this regard. If the United States refuses to halt nuclear testing and continues to carry out its nuclear explosions, one must assume that this is already being done in the interests of subsequent generations of missiles, such as Midgetman for instance, and also in the interests of the development of space strike systems within the framework of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative.

Right from the time nuclear weapons first appeared, the Soviet Union has constantly had to respond to those attempts that would have meant one side gaining superiority and obtaining the unilateral right to inflict nuclear strikes. Therefore, in response to the appearance of the atom bomb in the 1940s, our own atomic weapons were created. Then, with the appearance and the mass deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 1960s, we were forced to answer in a similar fashion by setting up the strategic rocket forces. The appearance on the U.S. side of missiles with multiple independently targeted warheads resulted in the response of our own Soviet-produced missiles with similar combat equipment. One must think that now too, if the United States will ultimately implement its star wars program, the proper response will be found on this occasion too. Only a total ban on the testing of nuclear weapons could really promote a halt of the arms race. In that event the nuclear armaments systems already in existence would not be improved, and the creation of new systems would, in practice, become impossible. That would really be a gain for everyone.

[Correspondent] Now for a final question. Probably you will be able to answer it much better than anyone else could. Can one allow oneself to think that after a nuclear missile was someone will be in any condition to play any sort of joyous and celebratory victory march?

[Maksimov] No, one cannot allow oneself to do that.

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CSO: 5200/1566



## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### PRAVDA CRITIQUES FRG DEFENSE CHIEF'S MORATORIUM STANCE

PHD91430 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Sep 86 Second Edition p 44

[Ye. Grigoryev "Rejoinder": "Woerner's 'Claw'"]

[Text] It is rightly said that you can tell a man by his friends. FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner has long been close friends with the chief and other officials of the Pentagon. In his official capacity but also, doubtless, on account of likemindedness and spiritual affinity.

In any event the Bundeswehr leader is marked by a particularly pro-Pentagon zeal. Across the Atlantic they only have to contemplate militarizing outer space and put forward SDI and he immediately joins in with his own Euro-SDI. And Woerner's endless speeches about "Soviet superiority" and the "Soviet threat"? He is always among the first European NATO advocates when Washington strategists find themselves in an unenviable position.

Such is the case, now, for example. In its refusal to stop nuclear tests the U.S. Administration stands before the whole world increasingly clearly as an opponent of nuclear disarmament. What does Woerner do here? He urgently calls a press conference in Bonn despite the holiday lull in politics there. It is clear from a report in DIE WELT which reached us with a certain delay that the FRG defense minister staunchly sided with the U.S. Administration on this issue, too.

With the uninitiated in mind, Woerner began by unscrupulously juggling with numbers. He alleged that the USSR has carried out more nuclear explosions in the last 13 years than the United States. However, he is certainly aware that one-third of the explosions in the USSR were carried out for purely peaceful, national economic purposes and that they were not conducted on test sites, which is the only place where weapons can be tested. Thus the United States has carried out incomparably more nuclear weapons tests than the USSR.

But is there nothing he will not do for the sake of his nuclear pals from the Pentagon? Shielding them, Woerner enlarged on the argument that the extended Soviet moratorium does not promote the solution of the task of cutting nuclear armaments. Why? The minister declined, of course, to elucidate. He did declare that the actual ending of tests was a "long-term goal," but also stated that until that far-off time arrives it is in no way possible to refrain from a "modest number of tests."

Woerner's "arguments," legerdemain, and phrases are identical to those of the Pentagon elite. And the course in its practical interpretation is the same: a course opposed to silence on the nuclear test sites and in favor of a further buildup (logically also in the FRG itself) of already overfilled nuclear arsenals.

It is quite clear that Woerner's line runs contrary to the feelings and expectations of the majority of the FRG population, major political forces in that country, and sensible figures, which even the ruling camp is not without. But there is another aspect to the attempts made by official Bonn representatives of the Woerner type to turn the question of banning nuclear tests inside out and examine it in the usual anti-Soviet light, since in so doing they essentially place additional obstacles in the path of creating the necessary conditions for a productive Soviet-American summit meeting and for curbing the arms race.

Are certain Bonn circles ready to share such responsibility with the American Administration? And why, to adapt and well-known proverb, must the claw be put in where the cowboy's horse is beating its hoof, especially when it is beating its hoof against nuclear detonators.

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CSO: 5200/1571

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### MOSCOW TV INTERVIEWS FRG DEFENSE CHIEF ON MORATORIUM

LD081123 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 7 Sep 86

[From the "International panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov: video interview with FRG Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by Vladimir Kondratyev at the FRG Defense Ministry in Bonn, date not given — recorded in German with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Gerasimov] No I should like to enumerate some arguments against the Soviet moratorium, and for this I shall clear the floor for FRG Defense Minister Manfred Woerner. Vladimir Kondratyev interviewed him.

[Kondratyev] The FRG Defense Ministry is sited on the outskirts of Bonn. For almost 4 years it has been headed by Manfred Woerner, a well-known figure of the Christian Democratic Party and a Bundestag deputy. He is 51 years old. He completed his education as a lawyer, but he is also considered an experienced military specialist. For example, as an Air Force reservist he personally flies aircraft. This is Manfred Woerner's first interview for Soviet television.

Woerner, the Soviet Union has carried out no nuclear tests for more than 1 year. It recently extended again its unilateral moratorium until 1 January 1987. How do you assess this step by the Soviet leadership?

[Woerner] Our main aim — I mean by this the FRG Government's — consists of creating security with fewer weapons, that is, security for you, for the Soviet Union and the other East European countries, as well as for our country and the other countries of Western Europe. However, a moratorium is not disarmament. Discontinuance of nuclear tests is an important task of our policy, but in our opinion it must be linked on the one hand with substantial reductions of nuclear arms and on the other hand with broad possibilities of verification [kontrol]. The following principle has to operate: The fewer nuclear weapons there are, the less need for carrying out tests.

The moratorium is not an end in itself for the Soviet Union; it opens the way toward attaining a comprehensive accord in the sphere of arms limitation. The Federal Government is ready to follow such a way, if the conditions that I indicated are created.

[Kondratyev] are you aware of the danger that the continuance of nuclear tests will lead to the emergence of further improved kinds of arms, on the control [kontrol] of which it will not be possible to reach an accord in the future?

[Woerner] Yes, and in order to avoid this both world powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, must come to an agreement on radical reductions in existing stocks of nuclear arms. This is our aim. We want you and the Americans to have fewer weapons. For our part we are ready to contribute to this. The Federal Republic has voluntarily renounced the possession of and the right to dispose of nuclear arms. We would like the whole world to follow our example.

[Kondratyev] But why does the United States refuse to accept the soviet proposal for a moratorium on nuclear tests?

[Woerner] First and foremost, I want to stress that I represent the FRG. All I know is that the U.S. President says that he is very interested in an end to testing, one that is bilateral, coordinated, and mandatory, but in the context of a reduction of nuclear armaments. I feel it is absolutely necessary to realize that our world needs fewer weapons than it has at the present. This is the decisive factor. I repeat: The fewer weapons there are, the fewer tests there will be.

[Kondratyev] As the defense minister of a NATO country, how likely do you think it is that the Americans will stop their tests? And when do you think this will happen?

[Woerner] We place our hopes, first and foremost, on talks between the two world powers. The FRG federal chancellor and the Federal Government are extremely interested in seeing a second summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan. I expect that one of the subjects of such talks will be precisely this question.

[Kondratyev] But the Americans are still exploding nuclear devices in the Nevada desert.

[Woerner] In answer to that I would say, of course, that before the Soviet Union announced its moratorium — that is, in the period since 1971 — it in fact carried out more nuclear explosions than the Americans had. Of course, I am of the view that such reproaches of numerical comparisons do not help. I feel that what is really needed is the earliest possible agreement on disarmament.

[Kondratyev] Allow me to cite figures given by an unprejudiced source, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It has calculated that since 1945 the United States has carried out third more tests than the Soviet Union has.

[Woerner] I was quoting the figures of the last 15 years. But, I repeat, disputes about figures do not help us at all. The main task is to reduce the number of terrible weapons, while keeping in mind a balance of forces between the two sides. If this is achieved, there will be much more point in halting tests and it will be easier to reach agreement on this.

[Kondratyev] Thank you, Minister, for this interview.

[Gerasimov in studio] Let us now take a look at the minister's propaganda ammunition in order to determine its quality. Well, Woerner says that a moratorium does not amount to disarmament. That would be a good point if the moratorium had been described as an end in itself. But, as you know, the moratorium is not in itself the goal. It cannot take the place of a reduction in armaments. Who is saying that it does? With whom is Woerner arguing? Everyone is saying that by abstaining from carrying out explosions a start has been made. It is the beginning of the way to disarmament.



The minister goes on to say that he is willing to follow this way, but on one condition. But he himself makes it harder to follow this way by putting the cart before the horse and demanding a substantial reduction in armaments. We are not opposed to a substantial reduction. So, let us begin with a moratorium at least. That is easier to do.

What a good boy West German has been, the minister goes on to remark. It has not acquired its own nuclear weapons. Yes, but there has been a surplus of these weapons on its territory for a long time now. Even General Rogers, the commander of NATO forces in Europe, has called for these weapons to be dispersed a little among neighboring countries that are shunning these weapons. But West Germany does not shun them. It takes everything that it is given. So, it is not the good boy that the minister makes it out to be. This is not nuclear innocence.

The fewer weapons there are, the fewer tests there will be. This is the minister's favorite idea. He raised it in our interview not for the first time. He has spoken of it in other speeches. But is he not putting the cart before the horse again? Is it not right to say that the fewer tests there are, the fewer new weapons will be developed. Is it not better to do without them, without tests, altogether? Another weakness of the minister's aphorism is that its basic meaning can also be disputed. After all, one can easily imagine some U.S. general or other deciding that the fewer weapons there are, the more important it is to make sure that they are ready for action and therefore they must be checked more often. Besides, one can employ the opposite argument: The fewer tests there are, the fewer weapons there will be, because fewer new weapons will be developed. And the variety of such weapons will also be less.

Again the minister says he favors a reduction in nuclear weapons. In itself, a moratorium will not reduce these armaments, but it will prevent their being improved. In other words, it will reduce these armaments by comparison with what might happen if there is no moratorium. How does the minister answer this calculation, which is reached by the method he uses himself?

What about the number of tests? He claims that at one time we were carrying out more tests. Even if that were true, so what? Who was carrying out the most tests before that? For some reason the minister did not address that question. If you look at the distribution of explosions — particularly underground explosions—over the years, you can easily see who is in the lead. As we know, the Americans are way ahead now, approximately 200 explosions ahead.

Well, as you saw, the minister subsequently adopted his reserve position. Figures are not very important, he said. In that case, what remains of the minister's arguments? It remains to welcome his willingness to reduce the number of weapons. That is good, but it would be better to eliminate them altogether. It remains to welcome his hopes and the hopes of his chancellor for Soviet-U.S. talks. The chancellor considers that the moratorium could be one of the subjects for these talks. Be that as it may, for some reason the United States has not expressed willingness to join the moratorium under any circumstances whatsoever. It prevents the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, you see. So, if you wanted to, you could see a contradiction here between the positions of Washington and Bonn.

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## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### FRG LEADERS' REACTIONS TO CONTINUED SOVIET MORATORIUM

#### Stavenhagen: Preliminary Step Only

DW191141 Cologne KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU in German 19 Aug 86 p 2

[Interview with Lutz Stavenhagen, minister of state in the Foreign Ministry, by editor Matthias Nueckel; date and place not given]

[Text] Reporter: The Soviet Union has extended its moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. Is it not up to the United States now to introduce a similar test ban?

Stavenhagen: A moratorium does not resolve the problems. The Federal Government wants to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement soon. Such an agreement cannot be replaced by one side suggesting moratoriums after having concluded its series of tests. A verifiable agreement is necessary. At the review conference in Geneva in 1985, the Federal Government advanced its proposal for a worldwide seismological monitoring system. I think we should continue to work in that direction.

Reporter: But would a moratorium by the United States not constitute a sign of good will?

Stavenhagen: As a preliminary step to an agreement, a moratorium certainly is a positive signal. However, we should not allow ourselves to be deceived by a moratorium because it could be interrupted at any given moment, and tests could be continued. We must try to reach a verifiable agreement.

Reporter: Gorbachev explicitly made the nuclear weapons test ban the topic of the summit. Is the chief of the Kremlin thereby forcing Reagan to move?

Stavenhagen: I believe that a test ban agreement is an important step on the road to a general and certifiable reduction of nuclear weapons. I am sure that the U.S. President, whose term is ending, has a great interest in achieving a fair result at the second summit. Considering the proposals and counterproposals that are on the table, I do not think that one side in particular is forced to move. There are a great many useful initiatives. Now the things that can be most quickly implemented should be done first of all. There is every indication that that will be a test ban agreement.

Reporter: Do you basically welcome Gorbachev's statements? Do they constitute a signal of good will by the Kremlin leadership?

Stavenhagen: Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev certainly has an interest in having quiet at the foreign-political front. He sees his tasks in the field of modernizing the economy and advancing the Soviet Union as an industrial state. To a larger extent than his predecessors, he views the comparison of forces not only under military aspects but also under technological-economic aspects. It fits into the picture that Gorbachev has a serious interest in agreements. However, we have to be very careful. There are also other forces in the Soviet Union. Verification remains the crucial issue. Gorbachev has always suggested a lot in his speeches; at the negotiating table, however, the result has been little more than scant. Gorbachev will have to be judged against his negotiation position.

Reporter: Considering the Federal Government's role, will there be negotiations with Moscow or the United States prior to the summit meeting? Will the summit meeting be prepared together with the United States on a partnership basis?

Stavenhagen: I assume it will. I do not know at this point whether there will be further meetings with the Soviet Union. As you know, Genscher was in Moscow recently. There is no doubt at all that an intensive dialogue will be held with the United States prior to the summit.

Reporter: Will Bonn also bring its influence to bear on the United States so as to achieve progress in the nuclear weapons test ban?

Stavenhagen: Yes. The Federal Government will certainly exert its influence. The Federal Government hopes very much that progress will be achieved regarding a comprehensive test ban agreement. Naturally, we will urge our U.S. friends and partners to reach agreement which must, however, be clearly verifiable. We have submitted proposals to that effect.

Genscher: Useful for Test Ban

LD191109 Hamburg DPA in German 1023 GMT 19 Aug 86

[Text] Bonn, 19 Aug (DPA) — According to Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev has "underlined the interest in disarmament negotiations and in a Soviet-American summit meeting. "In a personal statement, published by the Foreign Ministry on Tuesday, Genscher promised the Federal Government's support for all efforts at a comprehensive test ban. The Soviet extension of the moratorium "can" be useful for this, Genscher said. It is now important to approximate the Soviet and American positions on the issue of verification. Bonn will welcome it if a comprehensive test ban can be agreed on at the next summit meeting.

Genscher pointed to the "substantial contributions" made in Geneva by the Federal Government so far toward solving the verification issue. Concerning the further course of the negotiations Genscher said: "The statement by General Secretary Gorbachev that the way towards overcoming the impasse is through dialogue and contacts, through discussions and nego-

tiations, corresponds to the repeatedly expressed and practiced attitude of the Federal Government. Only with such an attitude will it be possible to dismantle suspicion and to achieve progress in international relations."

However, Genscher warned the Soviets to produce the still outstanding replies at the negotiation tables of Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm, for "mutual recrimination will not help to advance the matter."

**Voigt: Bonn Must Come Clean**

After the extension of the Soviet moratorium "the Federal Government must at last come clean concerning its disarmament policy," Karsten Voigt, foreign affairs spokesman of the SPD lower house group, said on Tuesday. It is up to Bonn, together with the U.S. House of Representatives, to induce President Ronald Reagan to change his attitude.

CDU's Ruehe: Extension 'Welcome'

LD190955 Hamburg DPA in German 0848 GMT 19 Aug 86

[Text] Bonn, 19 Aug (DPA) — The "welcome" extension of the Soviet nuclear test ban by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev "should meet with a constructive Western reply," Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU lower house group, said on Tuesday. Ruehe advised the United States "to have a break in order to promote negotiations" following the end of the present test series.

Ruehe, foreign affairs spokesman and disarmament expert of his party, also recommended the acceleration of the American-Soviet expert talks on the verification of test ban treaties, as well as a staged plan which will steadily reduce the magnitude of the explosions until a complete test ban is achieved.

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CSO: 5200/2753

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### FRG PAPERS DISCUSS U.S. REACTION TO MORATORIUM

#### DIE ZEIT Editorial

DW211430 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 22 Aug 86 p 1

[Editorial by "CB": "Warning"]

[Text] the Soviet general secretary's television speech earlier this week contains good news as well as a warning. It is clear now that Mikhail Gorbachev will go to Washington by the end of the year for a summit meeting with Ronald Reagan. Otherwise, he would not have limited the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on weapons tests to 1 January 1987. At the same time, the warning cannot be ignored that if the summit does not produce any result, the Soviet leadership will soon no longer be in a position to make any concessions at all.

President Reagan has heard the good news. He also wants the summit meeting. But will he take the warning seriously? So far

he has not shown any readiness to make cuts in his favorite project, SDI, either through direct limitations or through a test ban agreement. The Soviet Union is, to him, an economic basket case [preceding three words in English], so the only economic alternative is to meet the United States halfway.

However, the Europeans remember that economic backwardness has rarely been able to curb Soviet armament in the past. So they have every reason to take the warning seriously. And they have more than enough reason to reject the formula of U.S. Government spokesmen that a nuclear test ban is not at present in the interest of U.S. security or that of "its friends and allies."

#### SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG Editorial

DW211240 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Aug 86 p 4

[Editorial by "SCHR": "The Price for a Test Ban"]

[Text] The tug-of-war between Moscow and Washington on a nuclear weapons test ban has little to do with arms control. Rather, it has to do with politics — to avoid the ugly term propaganda. Gorbachev is obviously prevailing because he can exploit the public's naive belief that a test ban could check the nuclear arms race. However, that belief is an illusion. A test ban is at best a confidence-building measure. But a moratorium can only build confidence if it is real verification. It is also only helpful in the long run if it is connected with a reduction of nuclear arsenals. Otherwise, it resembles a wage freeze, which can only halt inflation for a while and leads to another inflationary surge after the dam is broken.

Thus the Americans take a logical approach by insisting on a verifiable test ban agreement, which should be connected with the reduction of offensive weapons. Nonetheless, they have met with little approval of their position because they are suspected

of lacking goodwill. Reagan's chief of staff Regan obviously has recognized that weak spot in the U.S. position and has mitigated the initial negative reaction to Gorbachev's proposal. He now thinks that a test ban agreement is possible if agreement can be reached on the verification issue.

The installation of seismographic stations to monitor the observance of a treaty, which Gorbachev is ready unofficially to concede to U.S. scientists, would also have to be granted officially to the United States, provided of course that the Americans do the same. That would be a fair price for a test ban, because without mutual on-site inspections, arms limitation will have no future. Declarations of intent for the next 6-12 months, which only serve to bridge preparations for the next testing series, are about as helpful as a wage freeze.

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## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### USSR: FURTHER COMMENTARY ON MORATORIUM EXTENSION

#### CD Envoys Cited

LD211711 Moscow TASS in English 1519 GMT 21 Aug 86

[Text] Geneva August 21 TASS--Having imposed a unilateral moratorium a year ago, the Soviet Union showed profound awareness of its responsibility for the destinies of civilization, Aleksandr Kashirin of the USSR said at today's plenary meeting of the conference on disarmament. He dwelt on the main points made by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech on the Soviet television on August 18 and stressed that saving the world of perishing in atomic holocaust in the nuclear age is a task for entire humanity, a concern of all peoples. The Soviet Union regards the moratorium not as an end in itself but as an important step toward a comprehensive test ban treaty.

At the request of the Soviet delegation, the text of Mikhail Gorbachev's speech of August 18 will be circulated as an official document of the conference.

A bold, unprecedented step aimed at an effective ending of the nuclear arms race, this is how the Soviet moratorium was described by Milos Vajvoda of Czechoslovakia. He said the time has come for other states having nuclear weapons, above all the United States, to give an appropriate answer to this constructive initiative of the USSR, which the whole world applauds.

Head of the delegation of the Polish People's Republic Stanislaw Turbanski said that the Soviet Union had made a new substantial contribution to the holding of the international year of peace. Peoples of all countries expect that the United States, too, will show a new approach in the spirit of realism, peace, and cooperation. But regrettably, this has not happened so far. Recalling that in the recent "Mexican Declaration" leaders of six states called for an immediate end to nuclear testing, China's representative Fan Guojian [spelling of name as received] described this as a just demand aimed at achieving peace and disarmament.

Nureddin Kerrum [spelling of name as received] of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic said that it is only the adoption of the moratorium by all and complete readiness to embark on talks to ban testing that can satisfy the aspirations of the world community.



CDE Delegates Cited

LD211715 Moscow TASS in English 1651 GMT 21 Aug 86

[Text] Stockholm August 21 TASS--TASS correspondents Vladimir Bogachev and Nikolay Vukolov report:

The Soviet Union's decision to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions evoked great response among participants in the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, under way in the Swedish capital.

During conversations with journalists, delegates assess this extremely important gesture of good will of the Soviet Union as another evidence of the sincere readiness of the Soviet side for a tireless quest for compromise solution to those problems that cause disputes and suspicion.

Representatives of various European countries note that the statement of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev on the Soviet television in which the work of the conference in Stockholm was assessed opens new prospects for a successful conclusion of working out confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

"We in Sweden have long been trying to help conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty for we hold that this would be an important stage on the road to the elimination of nuclear arsenals", the TASS correspondents were told by head of the Swedish delegation to the forum Kurt Lidgard. "The moratorium is a good step in this direction. This is why we welcome the statement of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev".

Even those representatives of NATO countries who usually try to play down the importance of the peaceful Soviet initiatives, now admit that Mikhail Gorbachev's statement markedly improve the atmosphere of the 12th session of the Stockholm conference. Indeed, already after the first days of the work as a result of the efforts of socialist countries, there are signs that the stands of the sides on key issues on the agenda are coming closer.

The opinion of observers was, specifically, drawn to the new proposal of socialist states on the question of on-site inspections. Head of the FRG delegation Klaus Citron described that initiative as a "good step", at a press conference.

The Soviet decision to extend the unilateral moratorium might create a good atmosphere for the conclusion of the Stockholm conference, might promote a favourable climate for the achievement of progress at the talks, head of the Finnish delegation Matti Kahiluoto said in an interview to the TASS correspondents.

At the same time, certain concern is caused by the fact that representative of NATO countries at the conference, while admitting the need for solving the tasks of the forum by the deadline, September 19, are in no hurry to advance concrete proposals that could promote progress at the talks.

Head of the Polish delegation Wlodzimierz Konarski pointed in a conversation to the need for the successful conclusion of the work of the Stockholm conference by its deadline with working out a mutually acceptable final document. "The successful outcome of the forum in Stockholm might become a turning point in the development of international relations, and will undoubtedly have a favourable influence on other talks on arms limitation and reduction", the Polish representative said.

USA Institute's Bogdanov

PM090904 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 86 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor R.G. Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, by correspondent A. Baranov: "Time for Responsible Action" -- date and place unspecified, first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The peoples of various countries and eminent politicians, scientists, and experts have welcomed the USSR's new initiative set out in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, assessing it as an extremely important step in curbing the arms race. Our correspondent asked Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor R.G. Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, to comment on its importance.

[Baranov] Radomir Georgiyevich, what in your view, conditioned the need for the Soviet Union to adopt a qualitatively new measure to curb the arms race: introducing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests?

[Bogdanov] There has probably never been such intensity and drama over the past decades of struggling to maintain peace as there is today. Throughout the postwar years the USSR has made gigantic efforts to prevent a nuclear conflagration from happening on earth. We took into account the political realities prevailing in the world: the existence of a U.S. nuclear monopoly for a certain period, then its nuclear superiority, which was eliminated by the heroic efforts of the entire Soviet people and finally the achievement of strategic parity with the United States. [paragraph continues]

I want to stress that for us parity was not an end in itself, it was essentially the only means that could stop the aggression that was being prepared against the Soviet Union and of averting the possibility of a new world war. Significantly, once our country achieved parity it almost immediately put forward a whole range of proposals aimed at reducing the quantitative and qualitative level of military confrontation.

In the mid-sixties we started a series of talks with the United States on strategic arms limitation. I must say that the very fact that the United States agreed to start a dialogue with the USSR attested to a serious change in the state of affairs. The talks were difficult and ended in the signing of several agreements, the most important of which were, as is well known, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II) and the ABM Treaty.

However, the drama of the situation was that, despite the talks that were under way on arms limitation and reduction, the U.S. side did not for a minute stop seeking a way out of the "nuclear stalemate," in an attempt to wreck the existing equilibrium. The United States continued to modernize its nuclear weapons and created types which could be used with impunity for missile first strikes against the USSR.

As M.S. Gorbachev noted in his statement on Soviet television, one of the realities of the nuclear space age is that "mountains of nuclear and all other types of weapons have been amassed in the world, yet the arms race is not easing up but accelerating." According to existing calculations, the 50,000 nuclear charges already at the nuclear powers' disposal are entirely adequate to destroy all civilization on earth many times over. But, despite this, the process of improving nuclear systems is continuing at full speed. Furthermore, mounting international tension is increasingly leading to these highly complex weapons systems being placed on so-called "automatic launch," or, as the specialists put it, "alert launch" [zapusk po trevoge]. Thus, terrible nuclear forces are gradually getting out of man's control and coming under the authority of computers.

With the advent to power in the United States of the Reagan administration, which proclaimed the idea of putting weapons into space, this problem became even more acute. But if one takes into consideration the fact that the program for creating a "space shield" was accompanied by extremely ambiguous statements about the possibility of winning a nuclear war (one need only recall C. Weinberger's notorious "defense directives") it becomes obvious that the Soviet leadership was faced with the need to take emergency measures which would not only supplement the arms control process that was already under way but would include a qualitatively new initiative in it. These measures are not only proposals but entirely specific actions.

[Baranov] But even before this the Soviet Union had repeatedly made large-scale unilateral initiatives such as, for instance, the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Wherein lies the particular importance of a step such as the announcement of a moratorium on nuclear explosions?

[Bogdanov] By ending nuclear tests on 6 August last year the USSR opened up the possibility of approaching in a realistic manner the solution of problems which had previously appeared insurmountable. Indeed, were the United States to join the Soviet moratorium this measure could place a reliable barrier in the way of the arms race.  
[paragraph continues]

After all, it is well known that nuclear weapons can only be modernized through systematic testing. Incidentally, this condition is also needed when creating space antimissile systems using nuclear-pumped lasers. If such tests were ended, metaphorically speaking, the teeth of the "nuclear dragon" would start to fall out and it would gradually grow weaker. In other words, the qualitative improvement of deadly weapons would be limited and an opportunity would emerge for reducing existing nuclear charges.

Furthermore, the announcement of a bilateral moratorium would promote the creation of an atmosphere of confidence between our countries, the lack of which is one of the main obstacles in the way of achieving effective agreements.

The Soviet Union is sincerely striving to establish this atmosphere of confidence. And the latest extension of the moratorium is the best evidence of that. The force of example and the mobilization of public opinion are also of great importance. For each unbiased person clearly realizes that the decision to end tests was very difficult for us.

[Baranov] If the sincerity of the USSR's intentions is not questioned even by certain members of the U.S. Administration, what is preventing the United States from joining in the Soviet initiative?



[Bogdanov] One of the most commonly used arguments against joining the moratorium is that nuclear explosions are not verifiable [ne poddayutsya kontrolyu] and consequently, it is impossible to be entirely sure that the other side is strictly adhering to its obligations. The Soviet Union has always thought (and this has been proved in practice, incidentally) that national technical means are entirely adequate for remaining informed about what is happening at nuclear test ranges in other parts of the world. However, showing goodwill, the Soviet leadership has agreed to all kinds of monitoring [proverka], including on-site inspection [inspektsiya], thereby removing the favorite trump card from the opponents of the moratorium. I recall that U.S. seismological stations, at which scientists who have come from the United States are working, are already in operation on Soviet territory in the Semipalatinsk region. However, the paradox is that so far these stations have only been able to register echoes from U.S. explosions thousands of kilometers away at the Nevada test range.

A no less hackneyed "justification" for the reluctance to follow the USSR's example are the claims that the U.S. side is allegedly way "behind" the Soviet Union in terms of the number of tests it has held. But the most elementary calculations show that since the start of the nuclear age the United States has carried out 225 more tests than the USSR.

Something else is curious. Administration representatives, including ranking figures, are sometimes stubborn in explaining their refusal to join the moratorium. The reason for this refusal is that the United States does not want disarmament; it is interested in improving nuclear weapons, since nuclear weapons form the basis of U.S. might. That is the cynical logic that Washington uses and is seemingly not ashamed of. If one recalls President Reagan's March 1983 statement, in which he claimed that his dream was to eliminate nuclear weapons, and if one compares these words with the U.S. Administration's present actions, there is an absolutely insurmountable contradiction.

I sometimes get the impression that U.S. imperialism is so accustomed to the existence of nuclear arsenals that it cannot imagine further world development without them. This is precisely the point to which M.S. Gorbachev drew particular attention in his statement — it is necessary to urgently change thinking and adapt it to the new realities of life, since "today it is impossible to ensure one's own security without taking account of the security of other states and peoples."

[Baranov] However, the White House's first reaction to the USSR's new initiative can hardly be called hopeful...

[Bogdanov] The reaction followed literally a few hours after M.S. Gorbachev had made his statement. Clearly, not a single serious foreign policy institution could have attentively studied this document in such a short period of time — that is, Washington, as has happened before, automatically said "no." Then, true, there was a certain change in this position. As is well known, Donald Regan, White House chief of staff and an influential figure in the administration, issued a statement claiming that the United States also wants peace and would not, in general, be opposed to ending nuclear tests, if...the USSR agreed to verification [kontrol]. It must be said that no more striking or perplexing statement has recently been made by the U.S. side. What lies behind it? Possibly an attempt to exploit the lack of information available to most Americans, who simply get no reports about the Soviet Union's genuine position on verification [kontrol] questions...

But we are inherently optimistic. Our history has taught us optimism. And in this case, too, despite the U.S. side's hasty reaction, we believe that sober reasoning and

common sense will prevail, at least among those Washington administration figures who recognize the dangerous threat of nuclear war. Whatever the case, the United States has been given another chance, until January 1987.

### 5 September Talk Show

LD060947 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 5 Sep 86

["International Situation: Question and Answers" program, presented by Pavel Kasparov, foreign political commentator of All-Union Radio; with N.V. Shishlin and Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, not further identified; V.V. Peresada, international affairs journalist; and V. Fonarev, USSR Gosteleradio correspondent in Harare]

[Excerpts] [Kasparov] Greetings, esteemed listeners. I would like to begin today's discussion of current problems of international life with what is unquestionably the most important question of the present day — the question of preserving peace in the world. Indeed, this is also your desire, dear listeners, and your letters on this theme come in a constant stream to us here at the radio. All of them without exception contain a high assessment and warm support for the new peaceloving initiative of our state in continuing to 1 January 1987 its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests. This step is a concrete demonstration of the new thinking in the nuclear age and also of the USSR's striving to create a new model of international relations which would allow the arms race not to be forced onward but to be stopped and finally curbed, and allow the danger of a thermonuclear catastrophe to be eliminated and thus to save mankind from destruction. This is the leitmotif of your letters.

However, alongside this, many of you ask the question: Will not such a long refusal to carry out nuclear tests while the United States is carrying out explosion after explosion have a negative effect on our defense capability; will this not lead to some sort of weakening of the USSR's positions at the military level and also to a certain extent at the political level? I shall ask Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, who is here in the studio, to reply to your question.

[Shishlin] These are very interesting questions. The alarm and worry shown by the comrades who write such letters is quite understandable. But, of course, this does not mean that I share this concern. This decision, as you know, was not an easy one for the Soviet leadership, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said, because indeed the United States is not responding with reciprocity to the example of good will but is trying to step up its series of nuclear tests and is acting in every way in the attempt to break through to military superiority — that is, to solve the task it has set for itself over the whole 6 years since the Reagan administration came to power.

But all the same, why does this concern not give sufficient grounds to require any state decisions? The main point here is that at present the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States is quite stable. When each side has the ability many times over to inflict on the other side what is called, in the language of military policy makers, unacceptable damage, then indeed it is of little significance if some extra quantity of missiles, nuclear warheads and so forth is added — when in essence, mankind now has no chance of survival if a nuclear catastrophe breaks out.

This is the first thing, — concerning the purely military sphere. Next, on the political level. We must not at all follow the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth and copy the actions of the U.S. Administration in everything. When the Soviet leadership announced the need for new thinking and a new approach to solving



international problems, this was no formula elaborated in someone's study, no abstract conclusion. It was a painful decision reached after deep consideration of the realities of the nuclear-space era in which we now live.

And these realities of the nuclear-space age require that suspicion be overcome, that fear be overcome and that distrust be overcome. How can this be done? Only by making progress in resolving key problems of international politics, precisely those questions connected with the consolidation of international security.

The simple, clearest, and most obvious step and one which is easily monitorable is precisely the cessation of nuclear tests. Did we propose to the United States before the moratorium that this problem should be solved? Yes, we did. The United States avoided this. When the USSR went in for a unilateral moratorium then, too, many voices were heard in the world that the USSR was taking a risk, since the United States was hardly likely to follow this example. But let us now have a look at who has won and who has lost; although, of course, here the categories of win and lose are not very precise. Yes, the United States was the pioneer and record holder in carrying out nuclear tests, and still holds these titles. But has there been any increase in the strength of the political position of the present U.S. Administration as a result of these nuclear tests? Of course not. Because the United States' own allies are beginning to cease to agree with the United States and its way of acting; not to mention the U.S. public — the latest opinion polls show the 81 percent of Americans are in favor of a freeze on the nuclear arms race as a whole and in favor of ceasing nuclear tests. So, here, the positive political balance of the Soviet unilateral moratorium is quite tangible, quite real. But what is this positive political balance? This is not something purely speculative, either. It is in effect the prerequisite for a solution. It is a real factor of pressure on those conservative, militaristic circles in the United States who cling to tests, cling to the nuclear arms race and who cannot think at all outside the category of the so-called policy of strength.

But the comrades are correct when they ask these questions in their letters that there are, of course, no simple decisions here. A very difficult and complicated and far from simple struggle is under way; and, of course, in this struggle one must have courage, will and reason in order to make progress. I think that it is extremely valuable that the USSR is making progress, not retreating, not taking a single step backward. That is, our strategic course, outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress is being maintained. It is pleasing that this course is meeting with increasingly broad support and understanding from the most varied political forces, not to mention the broad circles of the international public. [passage omitted]

7 September PRAVDA Review

PM100925 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Sep 86 First Edition p 4

[Nikolay Bragin "International Review"]

[Excerpts] The first week in September can rightly be described as a week of actions in defense of peace. Demonstrations organized all over the world by anti-war organizations and public movements in different countries persistently echo the demand for an immediate termination of the nuclear arms race and for the strengthening of universal peace. World Peace Day and the Day of Trade Union Action for Peace were celebrated on 1 September in the Soviet Union and many other countries. Mass rallies and demonstrations took place on that day in cities and

industrial centers in Europe and America and on other continents. They were held beneath the sign of resolute condemnation of the aggressive aspirations of Washington and NATO militarist circles and the expression of growing support for the Soviet Union's new peace initiatives dictated by readiness to do everything possible in order to open the way toward agreement on the ending of nuclear weapon tests.

#### For the Sake of Life on Earth

Public attention all over the world still remains focused on the statement made by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 18 August. The growing stream of response to this statement offers the most convincing proof that it has provided a powerful stimulus to broad discussions about the ways to free mankind from sliding closer to a thermonuclear catastrophe.

In the opinion of fraternal socialist states and of politicians and public figures in other countries, the Soviet leadership's decision to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions once more offers real prospects for making a practical start on the solution of the most urgent problem of our time — the ending of the nuclear arms race. "This step by the Soviet Union," a statement by the BCP Central Committee Politburo and the Bulgarian State Council and Council of Ministers says, "stems logically from the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, which adopted a broad and constructive program of measures aimed at terminating the arms race and preserving and strengthening universal peace and security."

The responses to the new peace-loving Soviet initiatives echo with growing persistence the demand that the United States should follow the Soviet Union's example and halt nuclear explosions and should respond positively to the Soviet call to come to an agreement on the ending of nuclear tests.

The echo of the continuing explosions at the Nevada testing range reminds people on earth of the obstacles and obstructions standing in the way, of how important it is not to relax vigilance and efforts even for one minute in the struggle to curb the nuclear ambitions of the present U.S. Administration, the military-industrial complex, and the Pentagon generals who are unwilling to heed the voice of reason and take the path of reaching mutually acceptable accords.

By continuing nuclear tests the United States demonstrates its scorn for the peoples' aspirations to eradicate forever from society's life the threat of the destruction of all living things on earth. Official Washington is pulling out all the stops to justify the explosions. [paragraph continues]

Its arsenal includes references to the fact that the United States has supposedly been "overtaken" by the Soviet Union in the improvement of nuclear weapons, and claims concerning the impossibility of ensuring effective verification [kontrol] of the ending of tests. All these -- if one may use the expression -- "arguments" collapse like a house of cards when examined in the light of the real state of affairs.

But the U.S. propaganda machine disregards facts. People across the ocean continue to intimidate the population with an imagined "Soviet threat." As always, C. Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense and present chief of the Pentagon, is striving to win the laurels in this thankless work. Speaking at an American Legion convention a few days ago, he again repeated the hackneyed thesis that supposedly "the main threat to America, beyond all doubt, is posed by the Soviet Union."

But even this blatant campaign is showing signs of failure. Fewer and fewer people in the United States are willing to accept anti-Soviets' fabrications at face value. Some interesting public opinion poll results were published in Washington last week. Some 48 percent against 36 percent of those polled said that they did not agree that the United States is weaker than the USSR in the military sphere. As regards nuclear weapons, 44 percent against 35 percent replied that in their opinion, the advantage lies with the United States (the remainder did not express an opinion). The real goal of the U.S. nuclear obstructionism is not a concern for the country's "security" but a desire to secure military superiority over the USSR, upset the prevailing equilibrium in the correlation of forces in the international arena, and secure a breakthrough for U.S. strike weapons in space.

"Even if we could effect inspection [proverka] of the observance of a comprehensive test ban treaty," THE WASHINGTON POST wrote a few days ago, "this would not be in our national interests." You could not put it any more clearly. As ever, Washington's present foreign policy course is based mainly on the nuclear missile big stick, which the advocates of the policy of "neoglobalism" would like to use to dictate their conditions to other states and people. No, it is not U.S. national interests but the great-power, hegemonist attitudes of that country's most reactionary forces which are pushing the U.S. Administration along the path of sabotaging the USSR's constructive proposals. Washington would like to impose a devastating arms race on the Soviet Union. These are dangerous, but also illusory calculations. Even the U.S. press admits today: "The majority of U.S. military experts consider that the Soviet Union will, without any doubt, be able to find effective countermeasures to U.S. technological achievements within the framework of SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative." The Reagan administration, THE BOSTON GLOBE writes editorially, "displays striking naivete in supposing that its 'star wars' program will bring advantages to the United States and will bleed the Soviet Union dry."

It will be no exaggeration to say that today the problem of a moratorium on nuclear explosions and of reaching agreement on the ending of nuclear tests has indeed become the key issue by which the people rightly judge the essence of different states' policies. Washington cannot help seeing that the USSR's decision to extend the moratorium for a further 5 months has been enthusiastically welcomed in the world and is perceived as an act of statesmanship according with the vital interests of people all over the world.

This was impressively confirmed by the support which the new Soviet proposals gained at the Eighth Conference of Nonaligned Countries' Heads of State and Government held in the Zimbabwean capital, Harare, this week.

Essentially, those who spoke at the Harare conference were unanimous that the Soviet initiative in the sphere of ending nuclear explosions marked the beginning of a new stage of practical action in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. If there were to be success in signing an agreement on ending all nuclear tests at a Soviet-U.S. summit this year, it was noted in the speeches, "this would represent a significant step along the way to solving the central problem of our time -- the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons."

At the same time, it demonstrated the growing maturity of the Nonaligned Movement, which now unites 109 states, and its readiness to make its contribution to the strengthening of peace, freedom, and independence for the peoples. Support for the stance of the "Delhi Six" on the question of the need to immediately conclude an



agreement on the ending of nuclear tests under effective verification was also voiced from the Harare conference rostrum. The political importance of this support and the approval for the Soviet proposals are obvious: The members of the Nonaligned Movement reaffirm their readiness to join the stream of all who are concerned with the fate of peace not in words but in deeds, who are prepared to play an active part in thwarting the aggressive schemes of nuclear maniacs.

Broadcast to North America

LD082046 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 7 Sep 86

["Top Priority" program with Dr Radomir Bogdanov, deputy director of the United States American and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Dr Sergey Plekhanov, not further identified; presented by Vladimir Pozner]

[Text] [Pozner] Nothing really dramatic has happened over the past week. We have no special story to tell you except, of course, the 19th U.S. nuclear test, the 19th, that is to say, since the Soviet Union announced its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests, now over a year ago.

And, of course, while this is not surprising, the Americans have kept right on testing notwithstanding the offer to join in a nuclear test ban, I repeat, while this is not surprising it certainly is indicative, especially what with the new round of talks going on in Geneva and all the leaks, which have also now become something we are used to; all the leaks that accompany these rounds and leaks that seem to indicate that the United States has some new and very important proposals. In view of all that, I'd like to ask both of you to look at these events — if we may call them that — in light of what is happening today and in light, of course, of the continuing Soviet moratorium. Dr. Bogdanov, would you like to begin?

[Bogdanov] Yes, but, you know, Vladimir, my first reaction to what you have said just now is that we still are facing a lot of dramas in this world. Public, state dramas, private dramas, and I believe that Nevada test is just belonging to that kind of event. They are just going along the same way of modernizing and trying to produce more and more sophisticated, more accurate nuclear weapons just to destroy our poor world. So it's indicative in the way that still there is a prevailing group of people in Washington, in this administration, they think in terms of fighting and winning the nuclear war. That is the first indication for me, personally, of this test program.

Now, you have touched upon the very important event of the second round of talks in Geneva. My difficulty is, or my question is, what we should expect out of them? Of course, it's too early. Now we have a number of American linkages, usual linkages before any round of talks that allegedly there is substantial — some people say — change in American position. Some people say no, we are not satisfied; but in any case even some figures were published in the American press what they are going with, what they're going to Geneva. But, you know, Nevada test and that mainstream in the American thinking, of this administration's thinking, makes me a little bit pessimistic about the second round of talks because I cannot imagine — maybe I am wrong — but still I cannot imagine how people who (fare) believing in nuclear war, people who are doing everything to produce more and more sophisticated, accurate weapons can come to Geneva with some substantial thing. If you have to give something to contradict me please try.

[Posner] Yes, why not.

[Bogdanov] That's why it makes me little bit pessimistic. You know, I am making a direct link between Nevada test and the — this coming round of talks in Geneva.

[Plekhanov] Oh, I agree with you that both these things reflect the attitude of the Reagan administration toward the problem of nuclear weapons, the arms race, the use of force in foreign policy, and a whole range of questions connected with nuclear weapons. I think that what we are witnessing now, er, well, I would say a radical difference between the approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States toward questions of war and peace and international security. I think it would be much better if the divergence, the difference between the two positions were not so great. And in Geneva a year ago, almost a year ago, we saw a little of bridging of the gap, coming together on some issues, at least in words. The statement signed by the two sides contained quite a few things which were very important.

But, you know, as we review what has been done by the Reagan administration since the Geneva meeting in November last year, we don't see really any real progress toward fulfilling the promises that were made there. In fact there was movement in the opposite direction.

I think that really the world is faced with a choice now: If it chooses to continue down the same road of the arms race we may be faced with a very real possibility of a nuclear war within the next, perhaps, a decade and a half, maybe we will not be able to survive before the year of 2000. And, what makes me very, very concerned about that is certain qualities which nuclear weapons are acquiring. They are becoming more and more accurate, and they're becoming more and more suitable for disarming strikes for what is called the first strike capability.

[Posner] Are you talking about counterforce weapons?

[Plekhanov] Yes, yes. If there is a counterforce parity, I mean if both sides acquire counterforce potential then I think the probability of a nuclear war, even an accidental nuclear war, will become forbiddingly high. This is a situation which has never existed before, and if we allow this situation to arise in the next 10 or 15 years then I think we are pretty much down the road to oblivion. And that, that's what motivates the Soviet program of nuclear disarmament by the year of 2000. Now one must really sober up in this day and age and really face the situation honestly and squarely and say: Where are we going? Do we realize where we are going? And, therefore, when people say: Well, you know the Soviet disarmament program, it's not realistic, it's a pie in the sky. Now what is not a pie in the sky? I think it's very realistic because it faces up to the danger that we are confronted with and seeks to find a way out of this danger.

[Posner] Would you say, would either of you say, that a nuclear test ban could play a significant role in lessening this danger because there have been some reactions in the United States to the effect that what we should be doing is talking about cutting back on nuclear arms and not talking about a test ban?

[Bogdanov] Let me put it that way: Suppose for a while that's okay. We cut — and I hope one day we will do that — we cut, but there is another, you know, problem with all that: if we cut without stopping modernizing existing...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Exactly.



[Bogdanov]...existing nuclear weapons, a so-called cut in those conditions would mean nothing, because if you replacing old nuclear weapons with new ones even to the ratio — suppose 1:3 — you will have more efficient one, nuclear warhead more accurate, with more destructive, you know, selective but destructive still, very destructive power, which will not only change anything in the existing, you know, danger but make that danger more imminent, because it may come to somebody's mind: Ah ha, I have such a precise weapon, with such a little damage, (?as they think); why I don't use it with these bloody Russians to make them to behave? Something like that, you know.

[Plekhanov] Perform a little surgery on the (?Russkies).

[Bogdanov] Perform a little surgery. That's why, that's why, why we are so so worried about this moratorium business, just not because it's very, very great, because it's really very dangerous in creating new weaponry, new weapons qualitatively different from what we have now. So what's use of talking about cutting without stopping to modernize?

[Plekhanov] Yes, that's my point.

[Pozner] You're saying that reductions are meaningless if they don't go hand in hand with something that stops modernization?

[Bogdanov] Yes, yes. That's my point. Yes, yes. [words indistinct]

[Plekhanov] I agree, and testing is meant to modernize nuclear weapons. This is what tests are for, not for making sure that the weapons have not rusted. Academician Bogdanskiy puts it quite clearly that, you know, a nuclear bomb is reliable for at least 130,000 years. And as a physicist, he is (?just) not worried that it'll get rusty and not explode when needed. So the tests that are being conducted in the United States are not conducted in order to make sure that the existing weapons are good enough; the tests are being conducted to create new weapons, more powerful, more accurate, more destabilizing and nuclear weapons, and nuclear powered lasers meant for the SDI. This is the purpose of the testing program, and I think that our desisting from testing, and the United States continuing the testing is increasing, makes it increasingly clear, what are the aims of the two sides in this business.

[Bogdanov] Now let me, let me add something to that, you know. Now, whatever you may say about how many tests we in reality had, now everybody is aware who is really responsible for the arms race. We have stopped our testing, we don't create new weaponry, they are doing it. Who is responsible? How they, they, they (?think) is absolutely clear.

[Pozner] Yes, but I'm not quite sure that I agree with you. It's clear to us, but I think there are many people to whom it is not clear because the Americans have an argument that they have to keep on testing because the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States, that we have finished our round of testing, that in the seventies we had a great military buildup and now they're catching up, and therefore they have to keep on testing; and there are many Americans who probably believe that.

[Plekhanov] Yes, but when the facts are brought into light it's very easy to come to the conclusion that the United States — if it is just a matter of keeping a balance with the Soviet Union — then the United States really does not need the current series of tests that it is conducting.

[Plekhanov] Well, because this isn't, this series, as I've said, is meant to increase the accuracy of the American...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] It creates, actually; they are needed to create a new generation of nuclear weapons.

[Pozner] A third generation.

[Bogdanov] Maybe third, (in some ways), even a fourth generation.

[Pozner] Okay.

[Plekhanov] Well, the SDI is the next generation.

[Pozner] But let's get back to this particular argument. What would you say to the view that the United States lags behind the Soviet Union and therefore has to modernize? Now what would you say to that?

[Plekhanov] This view is simply not supported by facts. I've seen the facts and I just don't buy that view. We are at the same...at this time we are in a situation of rough parity. The U.S. Department of Defense, in its annual statements to the U.S. Congress, has recognized that repeatedly, even during the Reagan administration. So it's something that exists in rhetoric, in the imagination of some people, and in the willful misinterpretations of some people.

But the problem is not really who is ahead. The problem is that if we continue racing we will be dead within 15 or 20 years. It is a very real probability that the two sides will not be able to stop this race to oblivion, and therefore the Soviet Union has chosen to opt out of this arms race, and therefore we are proposing that by the year 2000 we must rid the world of nuclear weapons. Let's keep it as a goal. Let's not forget that this is possible, it's doable. It can be done provided there is political will in the West, and we hope that that will appear within the next year. In order to dramatize the seriousness and honesty of our commitment we have been withholding from nuclear tests. We are saying: Look, we've decided to stop. Please join us before it's too late.

[Pozner] The Americans say that if they don't test, then they cannot develop SDI, which is probably true.

[Bogdanov] Which is probably true, of course.

[Plekhanov] Well, our response is: Why develop the SDI?

[Pozner] So when we are calling upon the United States Administration to join us in a test ban we are also saying, by the same token, stop work on the SDI, are we not?

[Plekhanov] Well, work on SDI is illegal under the ABM treaty of 1972. We agree that some research on a defensive system is possible — laboratory research — because you can't really verify what is, what's happening there, of certain components and so on. But testing and deployment is very clearly forbidden by the ABM Treaty, which was signed by the two sides in 1972. And by the way, this is exactly why the Reagan Administration is trying to break the ABM Treaty, to get the United States out. And they want our cooperation in this business of destroying the ABM treaty, but I don't think they are going to get that cooperation. We think the treaty is in the interests of both sides, it should be kept.

[Pozner] So, in other words, what we come down to finally is that a test ban is probably the most important step towards — leading towards — nuclear disarmament.

[Bogdanov] You are quite right, Vladimir, and if the other side — I mean our American counterpart — is really serious about doing some substantial business in arms control, maybe that would be the best signal just being sent to us, that they are serious about them. You know that so far we haven't got any small sign of that.

[Pozner] A final question, then.

[Bogdanov] Yes?

[Pozner] A final question: If we find the United States, regardless of public opinion in the United States — which supports the test ban, regardless of the House of Representatives, which at least supports a ban on any kind of tests over 1 kiloton — if we find that the administration is going to go ahead and test anyway, tell me quite frankly and concisely, in as little time as possible, do we have any hope for the future if they refuse a test ban? Dr Bogdanov?

[Bogdanov] My answer is no, we have no hope.

[Plekhanov] I would respond in this way: The world did not start with this administration and it will not end with this administration.

Cochran said the only thing needed now for the talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban to be resumed was political will.

#### U.S. Scientist on Verification

LD081003 Moscow TASS in English 0950 GMT 8 Sep 86

[Text] New York September 8 TASS — By TASS correspondent Vladimir Kikilo:

Professor Thomas Cochran, chief geophysicist for seismographs of the U.S. National Resources Defense Council, has hailed the Soviet Union's latest extension of its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions as a very useful and politically right step.

Speaking in a TASS interview, he said that the National Resources Defense Council together with the Soviet Academy of Sciences were conducting an experiment with the aim of proving that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was feasible and would be fully verifiable.

The technical aspects of the problem of verification and control, the U.S. scientist said, could well be resolved, while the existing seismic equipment was quite capable of verifying a treaty of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear testing.

Cochran said the only thing needed now for the talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban to be resumed was political will.

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## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### GORBACHEV ANSWERS CSSR'S RUDE PRAVO ON MORATORIUM

#### Ligachev Hands Over Replies

LD081439 Moscow TASS in English 1431 GMT 8 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 8 TASS -- Yegor Ligachev, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received today Zdenek Horeni, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, chief editor of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO who arrived in Moscow.

On instructions of Mikhail Gorbachev, he handed in to him the answers of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the questions of the Editorial Board sent to him beforehand.

#### Gorbachev Reply

PM081715 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 86 Morning Edition pp 1, 2

["M.S. Gorbachev's Answers to Questions From RUDE PRAVO Chief Editor Comrade Zdenek Horeni" — IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Question: Your statement on the extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987 evoked a very broad response and, it seems to us in Czechoslovakia, it has had a serious impact on the arrangement of sociopolitical forces in the world regarding questions of disarmament.

How do you assess the reasons for this and the possible consequences of the Soviet Union's major new peace-loving action?

Answer: The answer to the first part of the question seems obvious. Considerably more people have now learned about the Soviet moratorium than some time ago. The political leaders and mass information media of the West are finding it increasingly difficult to hush up the fact of the unilateral 1 1/2 year moratorium, and indeed, the U.S. arguments in favor of testing have become tarnished and their effect on the public has waned somewhat. That is my first observation. Secondly, an increasingly profound realization of the reality of the nuclear threat is spreading throughout the world.. This threat can be averted only by eliminating nuclear weapons, as we are proposing, and — as a first step — by ending nuclear testing. This is as clear as daylight, as the saying goes. Even people obsessed with the arms race cannot fail to realize this, in their heart of hearts.



Our socialist friends, communist parties, the conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Harare which represents dozens of states, the leaders of the "Delhi Six," numerous public organizations and trade unions, authoritative political parties, including the West German Social Democrats, and the British Laborites, and prominent figures of science and culture throughout the world have come out in support of the Soviet moratorium and have appealed to America to follow the USSR's example. On the whole it can be said that it is easier to enumerate those who have not supported our action than those who have approved it.

Words of support — and we value them highly — confirm that the new political thinking is forcing a way for itself through ingrained prejudices, outmoded notions, and through the obstructions of falsehood about the "Soviet threat."

So far as can be judged from American data, U.S. public opinion and a considerable proportion of the Congress support the idea of ending nuclear tests.

In a word, it has never before been so generally accepted that nuclear war cannot be waged and that there cannot be a victor in such a war whatever artful scenarios for hostilities may be devised.

Something else can be added to this: U.S. policy is beginning to scare people more and more; glaring manifestations of a militarist line have opened many people's eyes and no longer can anyone conceal alarm over the fact that a catastrophe really could occur.

The response generated by the Soviet Union's ending of nuclear explosions is also linked, of course, with the fact that this is not a declaration but action. For the fourth time we have extended the moratorium. A year without explosions is both a political and military reality. The trend of wisdom and common sense is now present in practice in world politics and can be developed and consolidated with an agreement on mutual prohibition of nuclear tests. And also by other bold, strong steps, and by the solution of pressing issues and issues that are overdue for solution.

Surely, for instance, it is important for the destiny of Europe and of the whole world to crown the work of the Stockholm conference with a sound accord? Undoubtedly it is. And for its part, the Soviet Union together with Czechoslovakia and the other socialist countries is taking practical steps to have that come about. There is a possibility — I have already had occasion to speak about this — to reach a consensus on banning chemical weapons and eliminating their industrial base.

Rational compromises are possible on strategic arms, medium-range nuclear missile weapons, and conventional arms if one in fact strives for a lowering of the level of military confrontation and for equivalent (ravnosnachnyy) security. An accord is also possible on strengthening the regime of such a fundamental document as the ABM treaty.

But things must be looked at as they actually are. The opportunities would seem to be multiplying but there is no change for the better.

In this sense the reaction in the U.S. ruling circles to our statement is indicative. From the very outset the reaction has revealed that at least in the entourage of the President, whose spokesman this time did not even attempt to conceal his annoyance, there is, for the moment, no serious thought being given to the elimination of the nuclear threat. This is why the extension of the moratorium generated such dissatisfaction there. One can see that people in those circles felt uncomfortable when faced with the new Soviet proposals. It has evidently become very difficult to justify one's stance in the eyes of both the world public and the U.S. public.

But once again they have set off along the same old road, seeking to belittle the significance of our action by labeling it "propaganda." But the question arises: If this is propaganda what do we want to prove to people and what do we want to say with it? To convince them that it is possible to do without nuclear explosions? To say that we are backing up our appeal for mankind to be rid of nuclear weapons by ending the testing of them? What's wrong with such "propaganda"?

But the question arises: If this is propaganda what do we want to prove to people and what do we want to say with it? To convince them that it is possible to do without nuclear explosions? To say that we are backing up our appeal for mankind to be rid of nuclear weapons by ending the testing of them? What's wrong with such "propaganda"?

In general, regarding our being accused of "propaganda," I have already said repeatedly: It is not serious of people to want to transfer our responsible political actions to such a plane. This is the wrong approach to take at such a tense, one could say, turning point of world development.

We do not want to win in a propaganda war. We do not even want to participate in such a "skirmish," considering it unworthy of the importance of the topic [schutaya yeye nedostoynoy vashnosti predmeta]. Our aim is to take a real step toward real disarmament. And we sincerely invite the U.S. Administration to do this. We want to get the negotiations moving in order to drive away the nuclear threat for the sake of the security of everyone and for the sake of genuine detente [rasraydka].

There is certainly a great deal of propaganda speculation surrounding our moratorium in the entourage of the White House, in political circles, and also in the press. The impression is sometimes formed that in the United States there is a general inclination to replace foreign policy with propaganda. How can we get a businesslike dialogue then, one that promises success? We reject such a style and we believe that we are talking about things that are too serious for verbal games to be played around them. And we want to count on the fact that ultimately we will be understood in America and that our appeal will receive an adequate and fitting response.

Speaking of the "seriousness" that we have been urged to show regarding our latest extension of the moratorium, I should like to say that today the attitude toward ending nuclear tests and to the speediest drawing up of a treaty on their total prohibition has become a most cogent indicator of how seriously each of the biggest nuclear powers does in fact regard disarmament, international security, and indeed the cause of peace in general.

In the 18 August statement, I have already said that one's attitude to nuclear explosions is a test of historical maturity. I am deeply convinced of this.

Moreover, this is a touchstone for verifying real purposefulness and for verifying the main content of a nuclear state's foreign policy.

Indeed.

If you want military superiority you don't need a moratorium.

If you want to continue the arms race, and particularly if you want to shift it into new spheres, into space, you don't need a moratorium.

If you want to have new and more sophisticated types of weapons a moratorium counts for nothing here.

If in solving international problems you count on force and intend to resort to diktat and blackmail a moratorium is also an impediment to you.

If you fear honest competition with the other social system in the field of the economy, democracy, culture, and the spiritual richness of human life, a moratorium is obviously not suitable for you.

If you are not concerned about what happens to nature or the human environment will continue to carry out nuclear explosions.

If the avaricious appetites of the bosses of the military business and all those connected with them are more important than the opinions and vital interests of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world you continue nuclear tests.

In other words, the attitude taken toward a moratorium reveals the real essence and thrust of a policy. There is no getting away from this.

But if there is a real desire to start reducing and then to completely do away with nuclear weapons, as both the President himself and certain members of his administration have officially and solemnly stated repeatedly, if there is a real understanding that nuclear war is intolerable, if the trust is that the United States does not seek military superiority, there are no fundamental obstacles to reaching an equal and strictly verifiable [proveryayemyy] agreement.

This is why we consider that "the ball is not in the Russians' court," as the silver-tongued heralds of the White House assert, but in the Americans' court.

Incidentally, the question is even broader and more significant than the attitude toward a moratorium, although, I repeat, the attempts to avoid this disarmament problem of fundamental importance, lose [rastvorit] it in other questions, and switch it to another plane are quite characteristic.

For if you catalogue the administration's entire post-Geneva policy, an alarming picture takes shape. Here we find the expediting of SDI, tests of the ASAT antisatellite complex, and other actions undermining the ABM treaty; the tests of a new ICBM and new aircraft and submarines and statements about abandoning the SALT II treaty — and at the very moment when it is being proposed that a second summit meeting be held with us; fantastic requests for the new military budget; appropriations for binary weapons; strong-arm marauding "neoglobalist" actions against Libya and Nicaragua and in southern Africa and elsewhere; and military maneuvers in the vicinity of the Soviet Union — from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Far East — which have no parallel since the fifties in terms of resources mobilized. Marshal Akhromeyev was right when he said at the Stockholm conference: Imagine what would happen if the Warsaw Pact countries launched such maneuvers!"

How are we to interpret these challenging military demonstrations? As a manifestation of peaceableness and an aspiration for mutual understanding or, maybe, as preparing the atmosphere for a summit meeting?

Incidentally, in and around the White House it is being stated outright: All this is necessary to force the Russians into new concessions. Such is the level of responsibility of those for whom the arms race is a pot of gold and, incidentally, the level of their understanding of those with whom they are dealing.

This kind of military-political practice prompts a very serious conclusion: They want to legalise the arms race; essentially this is material and psychological preparation for a world war. The question that the public is rightfully beginning to ask is: What? Is America preparing [sobirayetsya] to fight? If so, the logic of the administration's actions is understandable.

Associations with the sixties, when an extreme reactionary grouping nakedly expressed its White House ambitions, involuntarily come to mind. But at that time America itself put that grouping under siege. Other people came to power, and an opportunity opened up for curbing the spread of "cold war" and then, in the seventies, halting it altogether. Treaties were concluded, and some of them are still operating today.

But what are we seeing now? Military programs are again being launched, but programs of a kind which create a much greater threat of the unleashing of world war than at that time since this is taking place at a new scientific and technical stage of the arms race and when much bigger arsenals of weapons capable of destroying civilisation several times over are in existence.

Therefore the task for our two countries and all peace-loving forces is to prevent this arms race from becoming irreversible.

A much more serious responsibility than before — a special responsibility, I would say — for the direction which the course of world events will take lies with the American people. They have something to ponder.

I want to believe in the American people's sense, realism, and even elementary sense of self-preservation. Our two peoples need to cooperate, not be hostile; to be friendly, not fight. I again appeal for this.

I know, Comrade Horeni, that in your country, Czechoslovakia, in our country, and in other countries the following question is often asked: Does not a desire to undermine the USSR and the socialist community economically lie behind the policy of an uncurbed arms race? In particular, how is it possible to assess both the official statements and the conjectures in the mass media that the economic problems and difficulties existing in the USSR will force it, if a bit more pressure is exerted, to agree to one-sided concessions?

We do have economic problems and difficulties. We have been and continue to be open about them. There are a considerable number of problems and difficulties in other countries, particularly those which have recently embarked on the path of independent development. But surely such problems also exist in the West, in the United States itself? Moreover they are growing threateningly there, most acute problems are accumulating, the state debt has reached astronomical figures, and the enormous unemployment is again beginning to assume threatening dimensions, and social contradictions are deepening.

As for our economic concerns, we would like to cope with them more rapidly and better and therefore we would welcome any opportunity to switch resources and forces from defense into civilian sectors, into increasing people's prosperity. But we will never sacrifice security interests here and will not make concessions on security, including at talks. Indeed, the Soviet people would not allow us to do this.



We can see clearly the attempts to use the arms race to undermine the USSR and world socialism economically. And we will do everything to prevent these malicious plans from coming about. We will act in several areas at once: in the diplomatic, military, political and — indeed yes! — propaganda areas, but primarily in the economic area. We will increase the economy's efficiency, build up acceleration, and improve management.

From this viewpoint, high-quality labor by Soviet people and working people from the socialist community countries is simultaneously a contribution to the cause of peace. If we show any weakness, the pressure by the enemies of socialism grows. If we become stronger and more solid economically, politically, and socially, the capitalist world shows greater interest in normal relations with us, and any illusions that the course of history can be reversed are dispersed.

Question: Responses to your statement include some like this: It is said that neither a unilateral moratorium nor even a bilateral agreement with the United States on this issue would make any practical contribution to the solution of the nuclear disarmament problem. Is this so?

Answer: Under no circumstances can I agree with this.

Attempts are indeed being made to place the moratorium in opposition to arms reduction, and even to prove that it supposedly prevents the start of the disarmament process. The following opinion is current in certain circles and the press: It is said that nuclear weapons are an "evil," but a "necessary evil" since they serve deterrence, and if this is so, they need to have their reliability checked — in other words, tests must be conducted.

All this is absurd, if not an attempt to confuse people.

Way back in January we proposed a joint start on "eradicating the evil itself" — eliminating all nuclear weapons by the end of the century. Of course, this is not an easy task. But we also propose that it be solved stage by stage taking all complexities into account; we allow 15 years for this; we envisage parallel efforts in the sphere of the elimination of chemical weapons and radical reductions of conventional weapons; and, simultaneously with disarmament, we have in mind progress in the political, economic, and humanitarian spheres of international relations.

Attempts to set the question of ending nuclear explosions in opposition to the question of reducing nuclear weapons are in bad faith for one more reason. Such attempts sow the illusion that apparently the two powers had already "almost" agreed on radical reductions of nuclear weapons, and suddenly the USSR created an obstruction with its moratorium. But matters stand completely differently. Since the time of the Geneva meeting, and despite all the USSR's efforts, we have not moved an inch closer to an arms reduction agreement.

And yet, a mutual termination of nuclear explosions would immediately and substantially help an agreement on this. After all, termination of tests would essentially halt the race in the most dangerous sphere — the sphere of the creation [sozdaniye] of new types of nuclear weapons and their improvement. The only thing left to tackle is the quantitative arms race, which is simpler.

Thus, our stance is that the termination of nuclear explosions is organically linked with the reduction of nuclear arms and would seriously help solve this task. I am no longer talking about the political aspect of the matter. You would agree that mistrust, fear, and suspicion have a fatal effect on the international climate. There is also the ethical and moral aspect. To continue tests means to expend resources and funds for evil, while there is an unbelievably great and still growing need for them for good humanitarian work.

Question: It is said that Soviet nuclear weapons are "simpler and do not need reliability checks," while the American ones are "more complex and therefore their efficiency must be continually tested."

Another story is circulating to the effect that, prior to announcing its moratorium in 1985, the Soviet Union had improved its nuclear arsenal, considerably overtook America in this respect, and therefore can allow itself a break in testing, while the United States, it is said, now has to "catch up" and that is why it is conducting explosions.

What is the truth?

Answer: There is no truth at all. All these claims are false from beginning to end.

Specialists prove extremely convincingly that nuclear explosions are in no way necessary to confirm the reliability of already existing nuclear weapons. Reliability can be verified [kontrolirovat] just as efficiently and, at the same time, far more cheaply and safely by other methods, without nuclear explosions.

Prolonged practical experience testifies that it is possible to feel sure about nuclear ammunition without conducting explosions and while confining oneself to checking [proverka] the nonnuclear components of bombs and warheads. In accordance with the existing treaty, the United States and the USSR have not conducted tests with a yield in excess of 150 kilotons since 1974. Meanwhile, ammunition with yields that exceed this "threshold" constitutes 70 percent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and ours is no less. This means that both we and they have faith in the reliability of weapons even without explosions! Why confuse the issue?

If the Americans doubt the durability [ustoychivost] of their nuclear arsenal, let them embark on the elaboration of an agreement to terminate tests and our specialists will share with them the "secrets" of how to check the condition of nuclear charges even without tests.

No. The main purpose of the nuclear weapon tests being conducted by the United States is the creation [sозdaniye] of fundamentally new types of weapons. What does this mean? Here is what it means: New nuclear warheads, with greater yield and increased accuracy, are being developed [razrabatyvataya]. Space-based nuclear weapons — X-ray lasers with so-called nuclear pumping — are being created [sозdataya] in the course of the tests. Work is being done to prepare [podgotovka] a completely new type of weapon capable of striking targets both on earth and in space. Under these circumstances it is hypocritical to say that a test ban would produce nothing to solve the problem of nuclear disarmament.

With regards to the second argument, it could have sounded somewhat like the truth during the first couple of months of our moratorium, but not now that the silence reigning on Soviet nuclear test sites is into its second consecutive year. If the development [razrabotka] of new nuclear weapons and the improvement of old ones demand more and more nuclear tests — and this is undoubtedly the case — then, according to logic, the United States, which has conducted many more explosions than the USSR, plus the 15 in the year of our moratorium, should be far ahead. It appears, therefore, that we rather than they should be catching up. To put it briefly, the actual way in which the issue is presented is absurd.

We have also heard the following opinion: It is not possible, as far as tests are concerned, to be satisfied for a certain period of time with a compromise between the Soviet and U.S. positions; in other words, not a complete ban, but some kind of "regulation" [reglamentatsiya] of tests.

Of course, when proposing an agreement to the other side, one must never reject compromises outright. But the idea of "regulation" instead of termination still seems to me incorrect in principle.

In the first place, we already have regulation: the 1963 treaty and the so-called "threshold" agreements of 1974 and 1976. But they have not halted the arms race. It has even been intensified — of course, not because these treaties are in existence.

The very same thing could happen with the proposed "regulation" of underground nuclear tests. It is more than likely to result in the race taking another direction which would later appear to have been even more dangerous.

There can simply be no halfway solution to the problem of nuclear tests. There is only one honest way to present the question: Either agree not to test nuclear charges and put an end to this once and for all times, or signal the start of even more dangerous military preparations. There is no third option.

If the Americans were able to drag the world into a space arms race, whatever terms they might use to describe these arms — "defensive" or otherwise — it would certainly lead to an extremely risky destabilization of the entire military-strategic situation. The threat to mankind would take on qualitatively new lethal parameters. No one has the right to close his eyes to this.

Question: Once again, as with all the Soviet Union's other initiatives, President Reagan's entourage and representatives of certain other NATO governments are trying to distract attention from the cardinal problem you have raised — that of the nuclear disarmament process — using all kinds of speculations about monitoring [kontrol] and verification [proverka].

How do you evaluate this approach?

Answer: Precisely as you do — as an attempt to distract attention. They want to prolong the life of the bankrupt argument to the effect that a nuclear test ban is impossible to verify [prokontrolirovat]. This argument has become bankrupt, primarily because of the successes of science. Today it is possible to detect any nuclear explosion, even the smallest, by national means. In order to help resolve the problem, the Soviet Union has nonetheless consented to other methods of verification [kontrol].

The "Delhi Six" offered their services — we agreed; but the United States was silent. Scientists reached agreement on installing seismographs and other equipment near the nuclear testing ranges in the USSR and the United States — we supported this initiative too, despite the fact that the American Government was scornful of it.

Not so long ago I received a group of prominent scientists and specialists in this sphere from USSR, the United States, the West European countries, and Japan, and had a detailed conversation with them. I was once again convinced that they do not have the slightest doubt about the possibility of the most reliable verification [kontrol] of a nuclear test ban.

But at the moment, this is how things stand: The United States has not expressed any readiness to embark on disarmament and is talking not about verification [kontrol] of disarmament, but about verification [kontrol] of arms.

I myself and our military comrades have more than once had occasion to say: We know what the Americans are doing, what happens at their nuclear and other testing ranges. And their attempts to conceal some things, including some of their explosions (among them one carried out a week ago), convince us yet again that you cannot take them at their word. And indeed: We have no reason to trust the American generals, and we cannot count on trust on their part. We are therefore in favor of strict, scientifically substantiated verification [kontrol] and we will insist on it, including on-site inspection. But I repeat: not of the carrying out of explosions, but of the ending of explosions.

American instruments have already been installed near the Soviet nuclear testing range in Semipalatinsk Oblast. We believe that it would be possible to transform the scientists' accord into an official agreement and jointly keep an eye on things in order to ensure that a possible agreement on ending nuclear explosions is not violated. We could also think about creating an international, supranational network of verification [kontrol] of the ending of tests. I will take this opportunity to put this proposal to the U.S. President. The problem here is completely solvable. The fact that Washington is trying to portray it as a nut which cannot be cracked is simple to explain: The United States is not prepared to renounce the arms race, and so it is bluffing.

I repeat: They need nuclear explosions not for deterrence (there is nobody to deter; nobody is about to attack the United States) but for the creation of weapons designed for the waging of nuclear war.

Question: One last, delicate question, Comrade Gorbachev, if I may. Judging by numerous statements from the U.S. President's entourage, and indeed the Western press, they now want to focus the world public's attention on a new meeting between you and Mr Reagan and in effect to substitute talk about this for all the topical problems of curbing the arms race.

What can you say about that?

Answer: We are in favor of holding a Soviet-American summit meeting, a meeting which would be marked by perceptible progress in resolving at least one or two significant problems of international security.



After Geneva we took many steps to bring our positions closer together on a wide range of problems concerning overcoming the arms race. The approach which could be formulated as "all or nothing" is alien to us. But it is not worth having a meeting for the sake of "nothing." Perhaps that would suit some people; it certainly does not suit us.

The questions at issue concern all countries, the entire world community, although the measure of responsibility is, of course, particularly great for the Soviet Union and the United States. That is why, however much we are provoked, we do not break the threads of contacts with the American Administration, we do not call into question their usefulness, we do not slam the door (although some people in the West, and particularly in the U.S. President's entourage, would very much like that). But the value of contacts lies not in contacts themselves, but in their results.

We expect that the upcoming meeting between E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz will help to clarify where we stand at the moment, whether the Soviet-American dialogue has a chance of progress.

If they deliberately proceed from the premise that a moratorium is unacceptable, if the question of medium-range missiles in Europe is blocked, if strategic arms have to be improved, and so forth, then what is there to negotiate about? In the atmosphere of a frantic arms race, fueling of tension, and demolition of existing treaties, a summit meeting is hardly going to be of any use. But it would be quite easy to use it to deceive people, to reassure the public by creating a semblance of well-being and at the same time continue to dangerous policy. In fact, there are already attempts to do this by creating the impression that preparations for a meeting are in full swing.

And by fueling false optimism this way: Everything is virtually ready for the meeting they say — they are reckoning, perhaps, on making sure that they shift the responsibility for the results of their destructive policy onto the Soviet Union. There is another idea that probably has the same purpose: the idea that the USSR has concluded that you will not get anywhere with the Reagan administration.

But we attach too much importance to the time factor to decide now to mark time for 2 and 1/2 years. No. To wait, to delay would be an inexcusable error. We will continue to use every opportunity for productive dialogue, for progress toward the limitation and reduction of armaments, and for the settlement of regional conflicts and the development of international cooperation in all urgent areas. In this sense we have a clear conscience as far as the Soviet people and other peoples are concerned. And our Czechoslovak friends and the socialist community countries understand us well and consistently and firmly support us.

I want to stress that we very much value and scrupulously take into account our allies' opinion and are fully resolved to further improve the mechanism and methods of consultations and the joint elaboration of socialism's foreign policy. We value highly our allies' and friends' political initiatives and their activeness in the struggle for a new way of political thinking and active and equal participation in common efforts to solve the problems of peace, security, and disarmament.

I do not think I can remain silent about another aspect of the matter connected with the summit prospects. There have been many fabrications about my confidential correspondence with the U.S. President. [paragraph continues]

I do not want to disclose its content, but I will say something about the fabrications. Their sin lies in the fact that they are deliberately optimistic and there is something of a publicity maneuver about them.

In late July we received another letter from the U.S. President — a reply, as it were, to our initiatives. I know that in the West this letter is presented as something new in terms of Washington's stance, "leaks" have been arranged for the administration's benefit, and they pretend that the ball is now in Moscow's court. We will, of course, give the President our reply.

I have thoroughly examined the President's letter, under a microscope and through a telescope, figuratively speaking. I will not be more specific — after all, confidentiality was agreed. But I can appreciate people's desire to know what is in it — in this private letter. After all, it affects them all, all the people in the world. If they could see the texts of both letters and compare the significance of each of them in terms of unraveling the main knots on the path of disarmament they would see how seriously and responsibly the Soviet leadership approaches the problem of preventing war, the way we formulate our proposals in a specific and businesslike manner, taking into account the other side's interests.

They would see, too, that we are by no means without hope, that we believe in the force of reason and mankind's sense of self-preservation.

By our actions and initiatives we are seeking to strengthen the peoples' hope that the situation can be changed, that there is an available alternative to confrontation. I believe we have already entered the second stage of the global antinuclear process, the phase not only of hopes but of realistic plans and specific actions based on them. As a Communist I believe in the strength of the masses who are in the grips of the new thinking which points to a way out of the crisis situation.

The time for the adoption of joint, responsible — albeit compromise — decisions is the most valuable time we still have. But it is passing quickly. The age of nuclear weapons is evidently the most rapid of all the ages world history has been through. That is why specific action is so essential. I will end by appealing for this.

On behalf of the CPSU and all Soviet people I send best wishes to the fraternal Czechoslovak people.

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CSO: 3200/1574

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### FRG PRESS REVIEWS REACTIONS TO GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

#### Western Reactions Viewed

DW201142 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 20 Aug 86

[From the press review]

[Excerpts] Editorial writers today deal primarily with reactions in the West to the proposal by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev for a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests.

*Frankfurter Allgemeine* writes: We are probably not wrong to assess Gorbachev's speech as a struggle for publicity and for higher ground at the forthcoming summit meeting. Viewed in that way, the initial reactions from the Western capitals are strangely weak. It is not enough for Reagan's spokesman to say that a general test ban is not in the West's interest. It is indeed misleading for Bonn politicians — ranging from Genscher to Rugebe and Bahr — to applaud Gorbachev's speech. The British Government pointed out the inadequacy of Moscow's proposal, even though it was sparing of words. Gorbachev's preference for a nuclear weapons test ban is easy to understand. It would hinder U.S. SDI research, and anyone in the Western public who is not a disarmament expert would think immediately that a test ban would be a hopeful beginning to disarmament. However, that is not the case. The centerpiece of the balance-of-power issue is strategic weapons. Gorbachev expects the Americans eventually to overtake the Soviet Union with SDI. But now, given the large number of offensive weapons, it is still superior to the United States. That is the problem, and Gorbachev should not be allowed to divert the Western public's attention from it. No Western politician should welcome such attempts by the Soviet Union. The chances of disarmament will not deteriorate, but improve, if countries and public opinion in the West consider the issue in a businesslike manner and hold together as allies.

Freiburg's *Badische Zeitung* says: By its quick and its derogatory criticism of the new extension of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, the Reagan administration is taking things too lightly. On the one hand, Soviet party leader Gorbachev has made it clear that in his view a second summit meeting with U.S. President Reagan only makes sense if a rapprochement of the two superpowers is at least achieved in this arms control sector. Thus the U.S. Government should carefully consider what value it attaches to the meeting. On the other hand,

Washington's unyielding no allows Gorbachev to play the United States and its Western European allies off against each other. People in Bonn and elsewhere are aware of the crucial importance of a nuclear test ban to limit the nuclear arms race. They would be very happy to receive a positive signal from Washington — even if it were only a gesture contributing to reactivating the negotiations.

*Frankfurter Rundschau* writes: It is about time for the U.S. European NATO partners seriously to ask themselves how the alliance is supposed to continue, given the militant course of its leading power. The less than a dozen examples of reactions by Washington to initiatives taken by Moscow do not allow the assumption that U.S. President Reagan has become unpredictable. It has become clear that Reagan's tough attitude is predictable, and parallels to the cold war have become increasingly evident. However, that deeply violates German and European interests. We also feel very uneasy in view of the fact that German interests are represented by a government whose submissiveness — at least in the CDU/CSU camp — to the U.S. Administration is unrivaled.

Kassel's *Hessische/Niedersächsische Allgemeine* comments: By extending the nuclear weapons test ban, Gorbachev gave a signal. The moratorium is no selfless renunciation by the Soviets of nuclear weapons tests, but an instrument of moral pressure to force the United States to accept a long-term agreement. Gorbachev is aware that his proposal meets with worldwide approval, and that President Reagan's opposition to a test ban will meet with growing criticism in his own country and by his allies. His somewhat theatrical appeal to the Americans' common sense and dignity precisely hits the mark. For Reagan, he sweetens the bitter pill by holding out optimistic prospects of a summit meeting this year. In Moscow's view the moratorium constitutes a final advance concession, which was not decided by the Politburo without resistance. Therefore, the general secretary is under pressure to succeed. He needs concrete summit results allowing him to justify and continue his course. Therefore, the West would be well advised not to ignore Gorbachev's signal.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG Critical

DW201020 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 Aug 86 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed article: "Genscher: Bonn Supports All Efforts for Worldwide Nuclear Test Ban"]

[Excerpt] The extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on a nuclear weapons test ban until 1 January 1987 has met with different reactions in the Western world. The appeal that Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev addressed to the United States in a 30-minute television speech, not to miss another historic chance, was immediately rejected by the Washington administration. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, however, said that Gorbachev's speech reflected the Soviet Union's great interest in a summit meeting with President Reagan. He said that it also was in line with the U.S. and its allies' goals and expectations.

The reaction by the Bonn government coalition to Gorbachev's statement was much more positive than Washington's. The U.S. response, which is considered in Bonn as being quite curt, was criticized by the SPD and also indirectly by the government. Government sources said there was no reason to react as sharply as Washington had.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) said that Bonn supported all efforts for a test ban. He said that if an agreement could be reached on a comprehensive test ban at the summit meeting, which will probably take place in the second half of November following the U.S. congressional elections, the Federal Government would welcome that.

Volker Ruebe (CDU), deputy chairman of the CDU Bundestag faction, asked the United States to "pause and reflect on furthering negotiations" following the conclusion of its current nuclear testing series. He advocated a plan on the step-by-step reduction of the permissible degree of explosive power leading to a comprehensive test ban. That is in line with the policy that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl wants to explain in talks with President Reagan scheduled to be held on 21 October.

Karsten Voigt, foreign policy spokesman for the Social Democrats, said that the Federal Government should make an unambiguous statement on disarmament policy and, together with the majority of the House of Representatives, make Reagan change his position. In contrast to Washington's view, Bonn would have to insist that a nuclear weapons test ban was in keeping with NATO's disarmament policy goals, Voigt said.

Genscher holds the view that in order to achieve concrete results it is necessary to reconcile to the largest possible degree Western and Eastern proposals at all the negotiating tables. However, the West is still waiting for important responses from Moscow, Genscher said, adding that "mutual reproaches are not helpful" and referring to "substantial contributions" made by Bonn at the Geneva disarmament conference, with the aim of resolving the complicated issue of verifying any test ban.

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CSO: 5200/2753



## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### FRG'S GENSCHER TALKS ABOUT SOVIET OFFER

DW290800 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 2100 GMT 28 Aug 86

[Interview with Foreign Minister Genscher by moderator Hans-Joachim Friederichs on the "Tagesthemen" program in ARD's Hamburg studio on 28 August--recorded]

[Excerpt]

[Friederichs] Last night you gave a speech in Vienna. You said, let me quote you, that not every new approach in Soviet declarations and behavior should be dismissed as propaganda or even as an artful maneuver. Is that an admonishment directed at Washington, which, as we know, rejects the test ban proposed and practiced by Gorbachev. Is that not precisely foreign policy independence, which has repeatedly caused difficulties for you in dealing with the CSU?

[Genscher] No, that is not an admonishment directed at a certain place, but at all of us so that we can endeavor to examine seriously every proposal coming from the other side. It must not leave us speechless when new leadership, a new general secretary, comes up with new ideas, and when that new general secretary knows how to present himself to the media. It must not be rejected out of hand; on the contrary, it is at the negotiating table where the seriousness of such offers must be considered. Otherwise, there will be no progress.

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CSO: 5200/2753

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### USSR ENVOY ON GORBACHEV SPEECH, DISARMAMENT CHANCES

LD181859 Hamburg DPA in German 1817 GMT 18 Aug 86

[Text] Bonn, 18 Aug (DPA) — Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, Soviet ambassador to Bonn, saw chances for disarmament in the future on Monday after the Gorbachev speech. The extension of the Soviet test ban is logical and consistent, the former disarmament expert at the Geneva superpower negotiations said.

Kvitsinskiy attached particular importance to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. There could indeed be a negotiated result in the forthcoming final 4 weeks of negotiations. The Stockholm Conference is dealing with the dismantling of images of an enemy and the gaining of trust. "And your Federal Foreign Minister Genscher and our General Secretary Gorbachev talked in detail about this important topic in Moscow recently," the ambassador said to journalists whom he had invited to his residence for the television broadcast of the Gorbachev speech. This new style of Soviet public work in Bonn is also part of this general topic, Kvitsinskiy said.

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### BRIEFS

PRC PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR-FREE KOREA--Beijing, September 6 (XINHUA)--  
President Li Xiannian today reiterated China's support for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. In his message of greetings to "The Pyongyang International Conference for Denuclearisation and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" scheduled to open today, Li said that China opposes any move to heighten tension on the Korean peninsula. "We support the proposal for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free and peace zone and any other proposals that help preserve peace and stability on the peninsula," Li said. It is entirely justified that the Korean Government and people demand U.S. withdrawal of all its troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea and the establishment of a nuclear-free and peace Korean peninsula, Li said. This, he said, reflects the aspirations and fundamental interests of the entire Korean people and is conducive to the realisation of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea as well as to the safeguarding of peace in the Asian and Pacific region and elsewhere in the world. The Chinese president said that the Chinese Government and people always support the sacred cause of the Korean people for independent and peaceful reunification of their motherland. "We hope that the dialogue between the North and the South of Korea would continue to make progress, and the tripartite talks between the North and the South of Korea and the United States could materialize," he continued. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1531 GMT 5 Sep 86] /8309

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## RELATED ISSUES

### KOHL DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS TO U.S., USSR NOTED

LD171841 Hamburg DPA in German 1539 GMT 17 Aug 86

[Text] Bonn, 17 Aug (DPA) — Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has made a number of disarmament proposals to U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the past months.

According to his foreign policy adviser Horst Teltchik, Kohl sent confidential letters presenting his ideas for the dismantling of medium-range nuclear weapons, a global ban on chemical weapons, and for a nuclear test ban. In addition, he explained how the research into strategic defense systems could be brought into harmony with a policy of disarmament in agreement with the Soviet Union.

Teltchik writes in a contribution to a journal (*Die Politische Meinung* July-August) that the chancellor also sent to the Kremlin leader his views on the future development of the CSCE process and bilateral relations between Bonn and Moscow. Teltchik writes that today there was no lack of proposals for disarmament and arms control and no lack of forums. "Lacking is the political will to achieve concrete results."

According to Teltchik, Kohl intended his proposals to help prepare the second Reagan-Gorbachev summit agreed upon for this year. "This summit is a new goal to strive for progress in East-West relations," the chancellor's adviser emphasized. He warned of stagnation in East-West relations which could quickly lead to regressive steps in Europe. Teltchik recalled that visits to Bonn by Socialist Unity Party of Germany General Secretary Erich Honecker and by Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov have been postponed and have not yet taken place. The leadership in Prague did not consider itself in a position to make specific the official invitation already issued to the chancellor while environmental agreements with the GDR and the CSSR lay on the table waiting to be signed. Teltchik emphasized that the precondition for intensive relations between the FRG and the East European states was a decisive improvement in the overall climate between the two superpowers.

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RELATED ISSUES

PHILIPPINES' EXPRESS COLUMNIST VIEWS GORBACHEV PACIFIC INITIATIVE

Manila THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 21 Aug 86 pp 4, 5

[Commentary by Nestor Mata: "The Foreign Scene": "Mikhail's Vladivostok Tunes"]

[Text]

**T**HERE CAN BE no question that while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev may have waxed sentimental over the whole of the Asia-Pacific region (to continue our discussion of his Vladivostok speech), he reserved the most persuasive arguments, the most detailed plans, and the most mention to the region's big three: China, South Korea and Japan.

But while China and South Korea may have suspended judgment on the Gorbachev initiative, Japan gave an almost immediate — and strong — reaction to the Soviet leader's thrust.

To Gorbachev's almost plaintive gripe that Japan was secretly rearming itself, the government of Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone responded not only by politely insisting that it was not rearming, which must have been Gorbachev's initial hope, but indeed by affirming that it was on the way to doing so.

In other words, Japan simply cut the secrecy out of what now seems to be official Tokyo policy.

Tokyo, is indeed, increasing its defense spending — a euphemism for the process of rearming.

Almost two weeks after Gorbachev addressed the Asia-Pacific region from Vladivostok, the Nakasone government officially adopted a White Paper that puts Japan's military spending beyond one percent of its Gross National Product — precisely what the Reagan administration had been trying to persuade the Japanese to do.

Whether Gorbachev himself expected such an extreme reaction from the Japanese is debatable.

His references to Japan in his Vladivostok speech were copious and quite heavy — a mixture of accusation, regret, advice, wishful thinking (as when he imagined a meeting with Nakasone, if not with the Emperor of Japan), backhand slapping, and an outright pitch for Japanese business.

But such a cacophony of tunes could not but further strain Soviet-Japanese relations.

The Japanese have only made it too clear to the Soviets that the linchpin of any cordial relations between their two countries is the issue of the northern territories — the four

islands off Hokkaido, comprising close to 5,000 square kilometers, which the Japanese claim as theirs, but which the Soviet Red Army seized at the end of the Second World War.

Actually, the northern territories — also known as the Kurile Islands — were originally owned by Czarist Russia.

Sometime in the middle of the 19th century, however, Japanese settlers began occupying the islands. Thus, after negotiations with the Russian czars, Tokyo gained sovereignty over the islands by virtue of two treaties signed between imperial Japan and Czarist Russia — one in 1855, another in 1875.

But the Second World War came, and Russia went on a rampage as it maneuvered to secure as much territory as it could. The Kurile Islands were an easy target for the Soviet Red Army.

Not that Japan has made it as easy for the Soviets after the war. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was said to have been so irritated by the persistence of the Japanese in reclaiming the islands that he arbitrarily stopped all contacts with Tokyo — for 10 years!

His successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, decided to reopen the lines to Tokyo when he took over, but he too has been swamped with demands for the return of the northern islands to Japan.

Thus, until now, while diplomatic relations exist between the Soviet Union and Japan, both governments still have to sign a formal peace treaty.

The Japanese, of course can never be expected to pass up a lucrative business opportunity, especially one that Gorbachev himself opens up.

After all, Gorbachev offered the Japanese the possibility of setting up joint enterprises in adjacent and nearby regions of the Soviet Union and Japan, an outright invitation to Japanese business to invade the northern territories. Economically, that is.

Militarily and strategically — that is obviously another matter altogether.

And so are the Soviet nuclear missiles based in central Siberia, many of which are set dead-target on Tokyo!

No wonder the Japanese are not only wary but are actually re-arming today.

**UNDIPLOMATIC TALK . . .** Ambassador to the United Nations Patricia Byrne very very quietly arrived in Manila, without the big fanfare that accompanied the appearance here of Senator Richard Lugar. Oh well, Patricia is just the deputy chief of mission headed by Ambassador (retired general) Vernon Walters, but that shows you the big difference between a politician and a nice lady like Patricia! . . . A big peasant organization has criticized Agrarian Reform Minister Heherson T. Alvarez for issuing circulars without prior consultation with rice and corn farmers. Consultation, not dictation! . . . If the Japanese are not only talking but also rearming, perhaps it is because they are fully aware of what Russians say, when they are talking, "Keep your ax handy!"

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RELATED ISSUES

CZECH'S KNIZAT VIEW OF U.S. HOUSE DEMOCRAT ARMS PROPOSALS

LD172003 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 17 Aug 86

/Text/ According to U.S. press reports today, differences between the White House and the Congress have deepened even further. Here is editor Jozef Knizat on the subject:

/Begin Knizat Recording/ This is the sharpest conflict between the President and the highest legislative body. The fact is that should Reagan lose the Republican majority in the Senate in the autumn Congressional elections the implementation of his program during the last 2 years of his presidential mandate would be even more complicated. There is, however, also something different and more important at stake. To a certain extent one can talk about an attempt to regroup forces in U.S. politics. At the same time one can see a shift, albeit almost imperceptible, toward greater realism in connection with the issue of a disarmament dialogue.

The fact is that the House of Representatives has proposed cutting the military budget by \$34 billion. The House also wants to push through a ban on nuclear tests exceeding 1 kiloton and advocates tests ban on antisatellite weapons in the next fiscal year.

The U.S. President's reaction to these proposals has truly been very sharp. In yesterday's radio address he literally said that this was a case of a ruthless attack on U.S. security interests and at the same time an attempt to influence negatively U.S. positions in talks with the Soviet Union. In the past week Reagan was still talking in this connection about optimism but less than 3 days later he described military might as the main approach to the Soviet-U.S. dialogue.

So there is a visible conflict not only between statements and concrete actions, above all in the military area, but also the conflict between the words themselves is tangible. The question whether some positive reactions from the ranks of the opposition Democratic Party are not a part of more farreaching calculations concerning the next presidential elections is also appropriate to raise. Only time will tell. However, as Senator Edward Kennedy has said, the U.S. political scene is already tired of the continual rejection of dialogue and tired of the fact that the United States has not been approaching disarmament talks seriously. And let us add that politicians who think realistically, not only in the United States, but literally also the world over, call for the U.S. Government to later its attitude on this key issue. /End Recording/

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